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3Editorial
A Critical and Policy-Relevant 
Conflict Sensitivity
The impetus for this special Working Paper on Conflict Sensitivity (CS) 
emerged as KOFF swisspeace hosted a three-day Conflict Sensitivity Expert 
Retreat from 30 September to 2 October 2014 in Oberhofen, Switzerland. The 
retreat brought together some 40 leading international experts in CS from 
think tanks, NGOs, universities and donor agencies aiming to ‘take conflict 
sensitivity to the next level’. Skillfully guided through a facilitated process, 
retreat participants engaged in critical reflection and experience-sharing in  
a creative and innovatory spirit. 
 The process laid the foundation for the emergence of a community of 
practice on CS – the Conflict Sensitivity Community Hub (CSC-Hub) – which 
launched a range of actions intent on ensuring the topic continues to receive 
dynamic attention, critique and reflection. This Working Paper collection, 
comprising the reflections of different CSC-Hub participants, is one such 
action. Covering much discursive ground, the Working Paper is structured into 
four analytical chapters made up of thirteen concise yet substantive 
contributions.
 The first chapter launches into critical reflections on CS. It traces the 
origins and trajectories of CS, starting with Thania Paffenholz’s piece, going 
right back to the seminal debates of the 1990s on the linkages between 
development, conflict and peacebuilding. This piece sets the stage for discus-
sion on possible ways forward for CS, mindful of the multiple challenges and 
obstacles of such a thing happening, but also bringing to light the innovative 
frameworks, policies, practices and other factors that have sustained and 
ensured the continued relevance of CS. Building onwards from there, Sabina 
Handschin argues that the introduction and pursuit of conflict sensitivity may 
desirably thought of as an organizational change management process whose 
success or failure depends on how it is pursued. Thus far, the attempts of 
development and peacebuilding agencies to mainstream conflict sensitivity 
have been foredoomed. Handschin proposes a shift away from the notion of 
“mainstreaming” and towards the “institutionalization” of conflict sensitivity, 
drawing on experiences of transformation processes undertaken and tested 
by the corporate sector. The political nature of CS, is a point made by Matthew 
Scott and also one that is recurrent throughout this Working Paper. Given the 
enormous pressures for aid to be delivered quickly, CS analysis remains 
under-prioritised, which is a serious matter for consideration given what we 
know about resources of all kinds, including aid, in conflict environments. On 
the basis of CS being understood as a discourse of power, Marieke Fröhlich 
argues the epistemological necessity and merits of critically gendered CS 
approaches.
 Authors in the second chapter on policy debates examine and assess 
the ways in which CS has, or has yet, to meaningfully inform policy processes, 
frameworks and tools, programming and evaluation. Ever mindful that all good 
CS must begin in an effective contextual analysis while extending to the 
articulating of peacebuilding goals, Dominik Balthasar and Christian Scherer 
discuss the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States and the discourses of 
conflict sensitivity as complementary and even mutually constitutive of one 
another. Discussing the UK Department for International Development (DFID) 
4engagement with CS, Mark Segal points to the importance of conflict sensitiv-
ity reflexivity, in the form of ongoing self-reflection, monitoring and evaluation 
of CS work for all actors in the global system, regardless of their positionality 
and power.
 In the third chapter on conflict sensitivity and business, authors criti-
cally examine the ways and extent to which the private sector has engaged 
with CS as priority and practice. Andreas Graf, Andrea Iff and Rina Alluri share 
insights about the ways in which Inter-Governmental Organisations (IOs) and 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have accompanied private busi-
nesses on the CS path. While multiple barriers and challenges remain, these 
authors argue that the time is ripe for a mainstreaming of CS in business, e.g. 
discussing the growing voluntary and mandatory regulatory initiatives on 
doing business in conflict environments. Anette Hoffman provides further 
critical reflection on the necessity of, and practices intent on cultivating the 
‘business-peace-nexus’, including developing a strong business case for doing 
so through engagement with the private sector. On the more modest end of the 
CS spectrum, Hesta Groenewald discusses how CS is sometimes pursued as  
a means of risk mitigation, as in the case of Chinese state-owned enterprises 
operating in South Sudan and elsewhere. The more ambitious priorities and 
objectives of equitable development and peacebuilding are much less in 
evidence generally, as in the case discussed by Mark van Dorp and Karlijn 
Kuijpers, about a Spanish-Italian palm oil company operating in Colombia.
 Authors included in the fourth and final chapter discuss conflict sensi-
tivity as a vector for peacebuilding across sectors as well as CS monitoring. 
They grapple with CS’s priorities and challenges as related to different devel-
opment and peacebuilding sectors and concomitant practices. Critical of the 
siloing that has been a nagging concern in this field, notably between local 
realities, analysis, policy, programming and the broader global structures, 
Sidonia Gabriel discusses CS as an integrative force for cross-sectoral and 
multi-scalar approaches to peacebuilding. Building on this critique, Rachel 
Goldwyn notes the counter-intuitive paucity of CS application in security and 
justice programming. Finally, Kiely Barnard-Webster, Nicole Goddard and 
Isabella Jean provide valuable insights on approaches to CS monitoring and 
evaluation, in terms of CS processes, outcomes and even M&E itself. 
 The diverse and insightful contributions comprising this Working Paper 
collection reveal how far conflict sensitivity has come. It is a conceptually rich 
approach that has proven itself practically, if modestly useful.  Much debated, 
CS has become integrated into organizational processes, policy discourses, 
practitioner approaches and business practices. At the same time, the pieces 
in this Working Paper also reveal how much potential remains as yet unreal-
ized. Recognized as an important priority from systemic and organizational 
perspectives, it nonetheless remains conceptually elusive. The motivation 
underpinning this working paper compilation has been to inform this discus-
sion and ‘take conflict sensitivity to the next level’ by engaging with it both 
critically and appreciably, as it relates to different sectors, debates, levels 
and activities. 
Editorial
5 Over the years, many people have contributed to the evolution and 
ongoing development of conflict sensitivity discourse. Among them has been 
Ken Bush, who passed away suddenly while this Working Paper was going to 
press. His memory and work will continue to meaningfully inspire and inform 
our own CS work and that of many others. We extend deep gratitude to all 
those who participated in the Conflict Sensitivity Expert Retreat as well as all 
the authors of this Working Paper. We have been inspired and nourished by 
their ongoing engagement, critical reflections and analytical  insights. We also 
welcome the ongoing critical and policy-relevant reflections of our readers.
Sabina Handschin, Eric Abitbol and Rina Alluri
Bern/Switzerland, May 2016
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Critical Reflections
1.1  Conflict Sensitivity – 20 Years of Practice:  
 A Critical Reflection
  Thania Paffenholz
This contribution critically assesses the achievements and failures of 20 years 
of conflict sensitivity in policy and practice. It concludes that despite tremen-
dous conceptual, policy, and institutional achievements, the practice of 
conflict sensitivity on the ground in fragile conflict countries has still not 
changed much. This short contribution offers four explanations for the failure 
of conflict sensitivity to make the transition from policy to successful “on the 
ground” application in practice. These challenges need to be considered in 
future planning for conflict sensitivity interventions. This article will first look 
at the history of the debate and discuss conflict sensitivity’s main achieve-
ments; then, it will analyse the failure to implement larger change in the 
practice of conflict sensitivity around the world.  
1.1.1  The Conflict Sensitivity Debate in Historical Perspective
The aftermath of the 1994 Rwanda genocide was the starting point for the 
contemporary debate on conflict sensitivity. The international community, in 
particular development actors, did not anticipate these tragic events and were 
taken by surprise. This sparked a massive debate about the role of develop-
ment actors in conflict. The seminal works of Peter Uvin (1998)  and Mary 
Anderson (1999) critically analyzed how the international development and 
humanitarian communities inadvertently exacerbated conflict in Rwanda, 
Somalia, and other places. 
 In response to this criticism, the international community devoted 
tremendous attention to the issue. Conflict sensitivity made its way, appar-
ently successfully, into the donor and international NGOs community. Since 
the early 2000s, there has been increasing political commitments from 
multilateral and bilateral donors and INGOs alike, accompanied by numerous 
policy documents attempting to address these challenges. This was followed 
by expansive institutionalization of the topic across the international govern-
ance system: conflict units, networks, expert pools, and advisor positions 
were established within almost all donors and aid agencies. For example, the 
British conflict advisor pool has over 100 members across relevant ministries 
(UK Department for International Development - DFID, Foreign Affairs and 
Defense). In Germany, not only was there a conflict unit established at the 
Ministry of Development Cooperation and at major agencies like the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), but a joint working 
group (FriEnt) was formed to foster collaboration on conflict sensitivity 
between government and non-governmental organizations. A similar develop-
ment also took place in in Switzerland. 
 Among others, these efforts led to the creation of a conflict sensitivity 
expert community. Conflict sensitivity rapidly became the top cross-cutting 
theme in development, outpacing traditional cross-cutting themes (such as 
gender or environment) in terms of budget and staffing capacity. Peace and 
7Conflict Impact Assessment Guides (Bush, 1998; Paffenholz/Reychler, 2007), 
as well as countless training manuals, have been developed; “do no harm” and 
conflict sensitivity training has become a vibrant market. Today, so many tools 
to address conflict sensitivity exist that it has become hard to choose 
between them. Consequently, the quality of conflict analysis has tremen-
dously improved over the years as more and more project proposals and 
country programs provide high quality conflict analysis. 
1.1.2 Conflict Sensitivity: Institutional Success, Operational Failure?
How, then, can we explain the fact that the practice of conflict sensitivity on 
the ground in conflict countries has still not tremendously changed? Discus-
sions with country program offices and geographical units today often con-
tinue to remind us – the expert community – of the 1990s, when conflict 
sensitivity debates had just begun. Why is it that staff in donor and NGO 
offices have still not embraced the concepts and tools we painstakingly 
developed and created over the past decade?  Though analysis has improved, 
operational approaches to conflict sensitivity still appear more or less 
unchanged; or, at best, changes remain limited to a few successful pilot 
countries. What went wrong? 
 Three explanations are offered here as food for thought: 
No real mainstreaming took place: 
It is fair to say that conflict sensitivity has never made it into the mainstream 
of development, humanitarian action, and (surprisingly) peacebuilding. Though 
it has been declared to be a mainstreaming topic in development, conflict 
sensitivity has remained an expert talk shop far removed from everyday 
operations on the ground. The reasons behind this are related to the way the 
international aid system functions. Country programs are designed by geo-
graphically defined operational units, not by thematic units. These operational 
units, though well-versed in the specific challenges of their local region, are 
unlikely to be experts on novel topics in development cooperation, such as 
conflict sensitivity.  Conflict units were seen as isolated entities disconnected 
from the geographical units that run the show. Some donors like the Swiss 
Development Cooperation (SDC) therefore abolished their thematic units 
altogether, and established instead thematic networks across agencies with 
mixed results. 
 The picture is even worse in humanitarian action. Conflict sensitivity 
started with the “do no harm” analysis of humanitarian action; however, this 
never made it into the system. The humanitarian system is still mainly driven 
by urgency and crisis response, and has not yet fully acknowledged that at 
minimum the management of long-term emergencies needs to be conflict 
sensitive. The conflict sensitivity expert community has directed the bulk of 
its efforts towards the development community, inadvertently marginalizing 
humanitarian action in their conceptual and toolbox thinking. 
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sensitivity is also a pertinent issue for peacebuilding projects and program-
mes - although, strangely, still struggles with an understanding of what  
it means. 
Excessive focus on tool boxes: 
Conflict sensitivity is an overtly political issue that has been neutralized by 
being detached and insulated within tool boxes. As a consequence, conflict 
sensitivity is seen as a technical issue best addressed by applying tools or 
ticking boxes. A lot of efforts by the conflict sensitivity expert community 
have gone into developing check lists to apply conflict sensitivity as a tool in 
projects and programs. However, this has not necessarily led to more conflict 
sensitivity in practice. The reasons behind this are associated with the way 
the mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity has been pursued outside of the aid 
system’s standard operational procedures. 
 Overall, change in the global aid system will only occur if the change 
management process is effectively integrated within existing structures and 
instruments, and if changes are easily understood by operational staff. 
However, the dominant mainstreaming approach of the expert community has 
been to develop extra tool kits that practitioners may then find difficult to 
integrate in the field, as these represent an additional task in an already-over-
loaded work environment with competing requirements from headquarters. 
 As a consequence, the SDC, for example, has tried out different 
approaches to make conflict sensitivity a management task instead. Some 10 
years ago, Conflict Sensitive Program Management (CSPM) was introduced to 
show that it is a real management responsibility, and not just an additional 
tool for experts. Though CSPM was successfully implemented in a few coun-
tries with committed leadership, it was not mainstreamed within the agency.  
Recently, SDC made conflict sensitivity an integrated part of the obligatory 
country strategy planning for all fragile countries. However, even in this case, 
concepts and practices still do not match, as geographical units generally still 
grapple with how to understand and operationalize these concepts, and 
accountability for ignoring them remains weak.  Agencies like DFID and SDC 
have also tried to provide career incentives for professionals that effectively 
apply conflict sensitivity approaches. 
The debate on state fragility has quietly overtaken the conflict  
sensitivity debate without the expert community fully realizing it:
With the New Deal and fragility debates, conflict sensitivity has transitioned 
from a mainstreaming topic to a strategic focus and policy goal. In the New 
Deal, the G7+ countries and partners committed themselves to a holistic 
approach to conflict as a precondition for development and the transition out 
of fragility. The Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSG), an important 
component of the New Deal, include the implementation of peace agreements, 
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incidence of cross-border violence (PSG 2 Security). The New Deal also 
addresses internal social conflict, in terms of homicides, assaults, and sexual 
assaults, as important components of security, completing the holistic picture 
of conflict. 
 More recently, with the establishment of the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), and in particular the targets (16.1, 16.2, 16.7, 16.a) of Goal 16 
related to inclusion and the prevention of violence, the link between conflict 
and underdevelopment is commonly agreed now by the international commu-
nity. This approach has been made possible by prior work on conflict sensitiv-
ity, but has largely been generated from outside the community of conflict 
sensitivity specialists. As a result, the two debates on fragility and conflict 
sensitivity have never been fully linked. 
1.1.3 Conclusions
While fragility is the new term du jour in the donor community, it is not clear 
how this relates to conflict sensitivity. Is an approach of development to 
support countries “out of fragility” the policy answer and conflict sensitivity 
the tool kit, or is there more to both of them? This article has tried to shade 
into these questions in providing the reader with a critical analysis of the 
achievements and failures of 20 years of debates around conflict sensitivity. 
 In summary, since 1994, broad recognition of the ways in which the 
international system may inadvertently exacerbate conflicts on the ground 
has produced numerous policy documents and operational tool kits, but did 
ultimately not led to substantive changes in practice. This article presented 
three explanations centering around the argument that conflict sensitivity has 
never entered the mainstream aid system and remained an add on packed in 
tool boxes deprived of political meaning until the fragility debate took off and 
quietly sidelined the conflict sensitivity expert community. 
 The expert community must therefore find a response to these chal-
lenges if it is to remain relevant into the future. 
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1.2  The Institutionalization of Conflict Sensitivity: 
 an Organizational Change Management Process
  Sabina Handschin
Over the past 10 years, development and peacebuilding agencies have 
attempted to “mainstream” conflict sensitivity. The meaning and practice of 
mainstreaming, so that conflict sensitivity is sustainably embedded within 
these organizations remains however unclear. Though numerous checklists 
and other forms of guidance exist, there is seemingly no organization that 
could claim to have fully institutionalized conflict sensitivity. Why is that? 
 While the contribution by Paffenholz (2016) in this same volume pro-
vides insight as to why the practice of conflict sensitivity has still not changed 
much on the ground, this article examines the matter from an organizational 
management perspective. It argues that introducing conflict sensitivity to 
organizations is a change management process whose success or failure 
depends on how the process is led. Attempts to mainstream conflict sensitiv-
ity have thus far been foredoomed. On the one hand, the concept of “main-
streaming” is blurry in its definition. On the other hand, efforts to embed 
conflict sensitivity in organizations’ culture, processes and actions have been 
lacking a systematic approach. 
 This article proposes a shift away from the notion of conflict sensitivity 
“mainstreaming” towards that of “institutionalization”. It argues the merits of 
drawing on John Kotter’s (1996) eight steps model on leading change, which 
was developed within the corporate sector. Kotter’s framework helps to 
examine why development and peacebuilding agencies have so far failed in 
their endeavors to address conflict sensitivity systematically.     
1.2.1 An overview of conflict sensitivity ‘mainstreaming’ attempts
In the early 2000s, with the development of methodologies and tools for 
conflict sensitive program management came an understanding that the 
implementation of conflict sensitivity would not be effective unless supported 
by wider organizational structures, policies and ways of working (APFO et al 
2004; Conflict Sensitivity Consortium 2012). This required the mainstreaming 
of conflict sensitivity into organizations as well as developing the institutional 
capacity to do so. “Conflict sensitivity mainstreaming” was described as “a 
comprehensive, yet incremental process of integrating sensitivity to conflict 
throughout the entire programming cycle at all levels of the organization and 
across all programs” (Lange 2004: 16). Key components for a successful 
mainstreaming-process have been described as having a clarity of goals, 
commitment and motivation, an enabling organizational culture, capacity 
building, accountability and an enabling external environment (Lange 2004; 
Lange 2005; Barbolet et al 2005; Goddard 2014). 
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 1 See for example: Lange 2004 and 2005; 
APFO et al 2004; Barbolet et al 2005– as 
well as the conclusions made during an 
international Expert Retreat on Conflict 
Sensitivity organized by KOFF/swisspeace 
in Switzerland in fall 2014. http://www.
swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/
pdf/KOFF/KOFF_Events/2014/Conflict_
Sensitivity_Retreat_Wrap_up.pdf
2 The commonly shared definition of conflict 
sensitivity is: Conflict sensitivity is the abi-
lity of an organization to understand the 
context in which it operates, to understand 
the interaction between its intervention 
and the context; and to act upon the un-
derstanding of this interaction, in order to 
minimize negative impacts and maximize 
positive impacts. (APFO et al 2004).
 Several guides and checklists have been published to orient organiza-
tions on how to tackle the conflict sensitivity mainstreaming-process. These 
include the need to have the buy-in of senior management, the appointment  
of conflict sensitivity “champions”, the development of conflict sensitivity 
policies, the building of staff competencies in conflict sensitive program 
management, the integration of conflict sensitivity tools and methodologies  
in program cycles, documentation, and the sharing and learning of lessons 
(APFO et al  2004; Conflict Sensitivity Consortium 2012).
 
 Subsequently, development and peacebuilding agencies initiated 
processes to mainstream conflict sensitivity, often with the support of 
government peacebuilding departments, conflict advisors and/or external 
consultants. Conflict sensitivity policies were developed or integrated into 
existing strategic frameworks. Awareness raising and capacity building were 
undertaken, and agency-specific methodologies and tools were developed. By 
now, nearly all leading development and peacebuilding agencies have in some 
way or other pursued a kind of “conflict sensitivity mainstreaming”. Yet, as 
Paffenholz (2016) and others (Causton 2009; Goddard 2014) observe, the 
mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity has not been very fruitful. The chal-
lenges remaining are the same as ten years back, when conflict sensitivity 
mainstreaming discourse was just getting off the ground.1  
 Possible explanations for this failure have been advanced elsewhere, 
and include an excessive focus on tools and trainings, a lack of senior man-
agement buy-in, lack of accountability-frameworks and mainstreaming-
fatigue (Goddard 2014; Paffenholz 2016). However, processes to institutional-
ize conflict sensitivity have been misguided from the outset. Development and 
peacebuilding actors have tagged conflict sensitivity as a “cross-cutting – or 
mainstreaming issue” without being clear enough as to what this entails. From 
an organizational change perspective, the current guidance provided on 
“mainstreaming” conflict sensitivity tends to be random, lacking clarity on 
what needs to be achieved, and why and how change needs to be pursued,  
all within organizational environments that are fundamentally reluctant to 
change. 
 
1.2.2 Change as an inherent part of conflict sensitivity 
Conflict sensitivity is an approach that aims at transforming the behavior  
of organizations that operate in conflict affected and fragile contexts.2 It 
requires a shift in the mind-set of organizations and of their workforce. Fragile 
and conflict-affected contexts are unpredictable in their evolution. Organiza-
tions operating in such environments must be nimble enough to adjust to 
unpredictable contextual changes to ensure that interventions remain con-
text-relevant, while mitigating the risk of negative effects on conflict dynam-
ics and even contributing to a reduction of conflict. An organization’s capacity 
for adaptability and flexibility are therefore inherent elements of conflict 
sensitivity. 
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 Leana and Barry (2000) observe similar trends in the private sector. In 
volatile market environments, organizations should assume organic structures 
and processes so that they can best adapt to ever-changing markets, custom-
ers and competitors; strategies of continued change may lead to a competitive 
advantage for a firm (Leana and Barry 2000: 754). Parallels can be drawn with 
the development and peacebuilding field. Programs implemented by agencies 
that have internalized adaptability, flexibility and constant change as a 
working culture are likely to be more effective and context-relevant than 
organizations with rigid structures.
 Yet, as in the private sector, organizations in the development and 
peacebuilding field are frequently resistant to change. Firms are often caught 
in worldviews derived from “Newtonian physics” (according to Olson, 2001) – a 
view that presents the world as stable and predictable, and which sees a 
company as a machine. 
“The machine model is evident in current organizations. It can be seen in 
mechanistic thinking, focus on organization structure, rigorous analysis and 
measurement (…) decreasing variation, statistical quality control, extensive 
instructions (…) increased specialization, drive for efficiency, and centralized 
command and control” (Olson 2001: 2). 
 Olson observes that such organizational bureaucracies work well when 
conditions remain stable but tend to become dysfunctional when circum-
stances change. She argues that change processes often happen within the 
parameters of the stable worldview, taking place within existing machine-like 
structures and mentalities that have no capacity for fundamental transforma-
tion – and are hence not very effective (Olson 2001). 
 Similar trends can be observed with development and peacebuilding 
agencies that conduct conflict sensitivity mainstreaming processes. Despite 
top-management buy-in and policies that proclaim conflict sensitivity as the 
working approach, the reality is such that that implementation of conflict 
sensitivity remains sluggish. A gap exists between intention and practice. 
Efforts to mainstream conflict sensitivity – be it through training, conflict-
sensitivity championing, tools and guidance for conflict sensitive program 
management, etc. – are confronted with forces that are resisting change.  
They belong to an organizational culture that sticks to a stable worldview, 
leaving little space for fundamental transformation. Causton (2009) insight-
fully observes that “the question of whether NGOs have the appropriate 
organizational culture to operationalize such frameworks and actually give 
them purpose and meaning within the organizations has remained largely 
absent from the discussion” (p. 9). Conflict sensitivity mainstreaming is, or 
should also be about organizational/institutional transformation. 
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 In order to be institutionally engrained, a successful mainstreaming of 
conflict sensitivity needs a transformation of the different entities within and 
comprising organizations. This goes beyond the responsibilities of program 
departments, conflict advisers and field-implementers, drawing on a different 
experiential base and skill-set as well. Creative and long-lasting change 
depends “on the work of many individuals at many different levels and places 
in the organization” (Olson 2001: 5). The buy-in from top-management is 
important, but it is not enough. It is no guarantee for a successful embedding 
of conflict sensitivity throughout an organization. Rather, it represents a 
traditional view of change management guided by the truism that change 
starts at the top and trickles down automatically (Olson 2001). 
 So what might a successful approach entail? Change processes intent 
on transforming an organization’s culture and institutionalizing new concepts 
have to be led. Kotter’s (1996) framework of the 8-step process for leading 
change has set the tone in the field of change management which remains 
relevant today. Through numerous studies of transformational processes in 
companies, Kotter has concluded that successful or failed change processes 
are determined quite simply by whether the right actions are taken by the right 
people at the right time.  
1.2.3 Institutionalizing conflict sensitivity – Kotter’s 8-step process 
 for leading change
The ultimate goal of any change process is the “institutionalization” of new 
approaches, the last stage in Kotter’s change management framework (see 
Table 1). Institutionalization can be defined as a “process which translates an 
organization’s mission, policies, visions, and strategic plans into action 
guidelines applicable to the daily activities of its employees. It aims at inte-
grating fundamental values and objectives into the organization’s culture and 
structure” (Business Dictionary 2016). According to Kotter (2007) change 
sticks when it becomes “the way we do things around here – when it seeps 
into the bloodstream of the corporate body“; unless new behaviors are rooted 
in social norms and shared values, they are subject to degradation as soon as 
the pressure for change is removed (p. 8).  
 The concept of “institutionalizing” conflict sensitivity better points the 
way for organizations than the blurry terminology of “mainstreaming”. Institu-
tionalization results from transformational change processes, for which 
Kotter (1996, 2007) has identified eight stages meant to ensure that organiza-
tional change is sustainable. While a detailed description of the eight steps 
and a thorough analysis of the current conflict sensitivity mainstreaming-
attempts of development and peacebuilding organizations against Kotter’s 
framework go beyond the scope of this paper, two observations are worth 
highlighting: 
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 First: In Kotter’s article on “Leading Change – why transformation 
efforts fail” (2007), he argues that organizations often lack awareness that 
transformation is a process, which advances through stages that build on 
each other; skipping steps or implementing them wrongly will undoubtedly 
have negative effects on the entire change process. Recalling the guidance for 
conflict sensitivity mainstreaming provided by actors from the peacebuilding 
and development field, it becomes apparent why attempts to embed conflict 
sensitivity in organizations and programming have so far failed: The orienta-
tion provided is usually random, neither strategic nor informed by tested 
change management approaches. 
 Second: Looking to the eight steps, it is striking to note that develop-
ment and peacebuilding agencies tend not to measure up in at least five of 
them (discussed below), including the first three which are themselves at the 
base of any successful change process: 
 — Establish a sense of urgency: Intentions to address conflict sensitivity are 
seldom driven by a real sense of urgency. If not imposed by donor-require-
ments, development and peacebuilding organizations have little incentive 
Kotter’s 8 Steps for leading change 
1. Establish a sense of urgency
 Examine market and competitive realities, identify opportunities
2. Form a powerful guiding coalition
 Assemble a group with enough power to lead the change effort
3. Create a vision
 Create a vision to help direct the change effort
4. Communicate the vision
 Use every vehicle possible to communicate the new vision and  
 strategies, teach new behaviors 
5. Empower others to act on the vision
 Change systems or structures that undermine the vision
6. Plan for and create short-term wins
 Plan for visible performance of improvements 
7. Consolidate improvements and produce still more change before   
 declaring victory
 Reinvigorate the process with new projects, themes, change agents,  
 promote employees who implement the vision
8. Institutionalize new approaches
 Articulate the connections between the new behavior and impact
Table 1: Source Kotter 1996 and 2007
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to engage in a tiresome – and costly – conflict sensitivity change manage-
ment process. Unless conflict sensitivity is a genuine part of an organiza-
tion’s values, it is difficult to establish the sense of urgency that itself 
creates enough motivation for change to be pursued effectively.
 — Form a powerful guiding coalition: Change, by definition, requires creating 
new systems, which always demand leadership (Kotter 2007: 97). Conflict 
sensitivity literature urges the need for high-level management buy-in. 
While required, this is insufficient. Not enough emphasis is given to the 
setup of the team that needs to lead the process: Have the conflict advi-
sors or staff from program division sufficient leverage-capacity? Are there 
people on the team with the necessary leadership skills?
 — Create a vision: It is unclear the extent to which development and peace-
building organizations have developed a clear vision of a future where 
conflict sensitivity is institutionalized in their organizational culture, 
processes and programs, and what change that would bring. A vision helps 
clarify the direction in which an organization needs to move. Without a 
vision, transformation efforts can easily dissolve into a list of projects, 
incompatible directives and plans that can take an organization in the 
wrong direction or nowhere at all (Kotter 2007: 99). 
 — Empower others to act on the vision: Administrative and financial proce-
dures are often mentioned by organizations as bottlenecks for successful 
conflict sensitive program implementation. Yet experience shows that staff 
from operations-departments are seldom brought on board when trainings 
or awareness raising workshops on conflict sensitivity are organized. 
Neither are they part of the group that is tasked to lead the mainstreaming-
process. In order to embed conflict sensitivity into the DNA of an organiza-
tion, the hearts and minds of the entire workforce need to be won; empow-
erment goes along with sense-making and meaning, which require the 
necessary leadership and communication to do so (Kotter 2002). 
 — Plan for and create short-term wins: Kotter (2007) observes, “real transfor-
mation takes time, and a renewal effort risks losing momentum if there are 
no short-term goals to meet and celebrate. Most people won’t go on the 
long march unless they see compelling evidence in 12 to 24 months” (p. 
102). In current conflict sensitivity processes, little is undertaken to show 
examples that might convince people to remain engaged. While positive 
effects of conflict sensitive development and peacebuilding can be less 
(quickly) measurable than in business, mechanisms such as sharing 
anecdotes from the field and cross-departmental learning events can be 
effective means to keep people’s interest high and the sense of urgency for 
conflict sensitivity ever present.    
1.2.4 Conclusions
An effective institutionalization of conflict sensitivity must derive from a well 
thought-through and strategically designed change management process. 
This demands openness towards transformation across an organization and 
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the readiness to challenge established ways of working. In order to contribute 
effectively to work being done on the ground, conflict sensitivity needs to be 
as much part of an organization’s processes, strategies and policies as of its 
values and culture embodied in the mind-set and behavior of the people that 
represent it. Development and peacebuilding organizations that see them-
selves as becoming more conflict sensitive are encouraged to learn from 
change management models developed and tested in the corporate world. 
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1.3  Bridging Rhetoric and Reality on Commitments 
 to Conflict Sensitivity
  Matthew Scott
Bridging the divide between aspirations and practice of conflict-sensitivity 
should be a high priority for the aid sector. Both locally, and globally, there is 
an abundance of evidence to suggest that, despite many NGO and donor 
commitments to conflict-sensitivity, much of aid remains insensitive to the 
unique needs of people in conflict contexts.
 At the local level, thousands of recipients of aid have made it abun-
dantly clear that aid still fails to “support … positive economic, social, and 
political change”.1 Recipients expect aid to improve their economic, political 
and security conditions, and expect a sense of solidarity and support, but aid 
often falls well short of these expectations. While aid delivers concrete 
benefits and empowers certain vulnerable groups such as women, its recipi-
ents around the world experience increased dependency and powerlessness, 
conflict and tensions among groups, and mistrust and disrespect in their 
relationship with aid agencies (Anderson et al., 2012: 21). At the local level, aid 
is too often failing to be conflict-sensitive, notwithstanding long-standing 
commitments by aid actors to ‘Do No Harm’. 
 At the global level, policy commitments to conflict-sensitivity often 
remain just that. There is no shortage of international policy frameworks 
encapsulating the international policy consensus on conflict-sensitivity in aid. 
The World Bank, OECD-DAC donors, UN agencies, national and international 
NGOs, and fragile states have each ascribed to a variety of principles and 
declarations about conflict-sensitivity.2 Yet as laudable and sound as these 
commitments are, conflict-sensitive actions falter at the local level when 
faced with political or funding obstacles, or simply get crowded out by the 
tyranny of the urgent. Greater accountability to commitments may help go 
some way to bridge this gap, but ensuring conflict-sensitivity happens locally 
requires dealing with politics, money, and priorities.
1.3.1 Ongoing challenges
World Vision has partnered with other organisations to attempt to bridge this 
gap, but the challenges are substantial. Our large local presence in fragile 
states and access to policy-makers in world capitals gives World Vision some 
advantages in removing obstacles to conflict-sensitive aid. As a large and 
complex organisation, World Vision is not immune from this rhetorical gap, 
despite a stated commitment to ‘Do No Harm’ across all our programming and 
a series of commitments to conflict-sensitivity in fragile contexts.3 The 
pressures and constraints to deliver aid as quickly and cheaply as possible 
apply to World Vision just as to other multi-mandate NGOs and UN agencies.  
A long list of other ‘sensitivities’ compete with ‘conflict’ for integration into 
programming. These include child-friendly approaches, gender-sensitive 
 1 According to almost 6,000 people “who 
either directly received assistance or ob-
served others in their societies doing so” 
(Anderson et al., 2013: 1-2).
2 The 2011 World Development Report, 
the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile 
States, a variety of OECD programming 
guidance documents, UNDP frameworks, 
and many NGO frameworks all affirm the 
importance of conflict-sensitivity.
3 For example, a variety of internal docu-
ments affirm a standard that 50% of all 
programme staff in the 6 most fragile ope-
rating contexts should receive on-line ori-
entation to the ‘Do No Harm’ framework. In 
addition, the organisation-wide guidance 
for strategy development includes a 
requirement to conduct regular conflict 
analysis in the most fragile contexts.
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 4 A secondary ancillary benefit of conflict 
analyses can be improved relationships 
among participants who may represent 
different parts of the conflict, although 
there are very important cautions about 
managing personal inter-relational expec-
tations for reconciliation during a conflict 
analysis exercise (Garred, 2015: 146).
approaches, climate-sensitive interventions, and disability-sensitivity, to 
name a few. Furthermore, field staff and country directors frequently have  
to weigh their willingness to carry out conflict analyses or train their staff in 
conflict-sensitivity against staff capacity, institutional donor pressure (inflex-
ibility in timing or funding), and basic security concerns. The most important 
thing to overcome the inertia against conflict-sensitivity at the local level is  
to make it concrete and immediately helpful to aid actors. One of the most 
reliable and tangible activities in conflict-sensitivity is conflict analysis.
1.3.2   Conflict analysis
Conflict analysis has been an unheralded but effective driver of conflict-sensi-
tive aid. Since Mary Anderson’s 1999 monograph, “Do No Harm”, aid actors 
have had a robust and replicable framework for local-level conflict analysis. In 
2011, a DfID-funded conflict-sensitivity consortium listed 15 different conflict 
analysis frameworks (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2011: 12-14). In 2012 the 
OECD listed 6 conflict analysis tools in its Evaluation Guidance for donors 
(OECD-DAC, 2012: 79). World Vision has developed adaptations of existing 
tools and some of its own, and has partnered with NGOs such as CARE, Oxfam 
and Saferworld as well as with UN agencies on MSTC, and with many local 
organisations on DNH assessments. Many conflict analysis have changed the 
way aid is delivered, but the challenge remains applying analysis findings to 
programming.
 Convincing harried aid actors of the vital importance of conflict-sensi-
tivity is not easy. A busy humanitarian or development practitioner will often 
balk at the idea of conflict analysis on the grounds that the sensitively politi-
cal nature of these discussions could raise the ire of the host government, for 
instance. Another complaint is that conflict analysis takes too long or takes 
precious funding away from project activities that feed or house vulnerable 
people. World Vision’s Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts (MSTC) approach, 
for instance, costs between US$20,000-35,000, requires 4 days of focus from 
about 25 local civil society participants, and about 10 days’ work from the 
principal facilitator. Another World Vision tool, the Good Enough Conflict 
Analysis for Rapid Response (GECARR) costs less and can be done more 
quickly. Conflict analysis tools fall in a wide range of costs and time commit-
ment. Sometimes even the increased time required is enough to convince aid 
workers to skip conflict analysis. Many aid response managers do not consider 
conflict analysis as capable of mitigating threats to participants or aid work-
ers, or event the failure of the project.
 When aid workers are able to invest in conflict analysis, the results are 
often transformative. An important ancillary benefit of conflict analysis4 can 
be new programmatic collaborations among NGOs, and even a broad inter-
agency consensus on the driving forces of violent conflict (Garred, 2015:151). 
The benefits of sharing conflict analyses between aid actors – especially 
between multilateral organisations, civil society, and donors – are obvious but 
the practicalities are challenging. Some civil society actors may feel threat-
ened by a government hostile to civil society or to certain ethnic, religious, or 
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linguistic groups. Some UN agencies or donors may have their own security 
reasons for not providing access to intelligence or military data to local 
actors. Notwithstanding these challenges, good conflict analysis at the very 
least avoids ‘boilerplate’ programming and interventions that are inappropri-
ate for the particularities of specific contexts.   
1.3.3 An example from Somalia
These challenges have been highlighted in Somalia and Somaliland. The 
Somali New Deal Compact agreed in September 2013 between the government 
and its aid donors aims to promote peace and security through aid. Principle 9 
of the Somali Compact commits all parties to provide aid “in a conflict sensi-
tive manner” (Somalia, 15). Likewise, “…interventions through the Somaliland 
Special Agreement must be underpinned by an adherence to conflict sensitiv-
ity” (Somalia, 26). These important policy documents reiterate that conflict-
sensitive assistance requires “A clear understanding of the overarching and 
local conflict dynamics must underpin the development of programs.” (Soma-
lia, 9) and a “…clear conflict sensitivity strategy…” (14). 
 In the Somali context, both politics and funding have been obstacles  
to realising the commitments to conflict-sensitivity, and more specifically to 
conflict analysis. World Vision and Saferworld conducted field research in 
2014 into the implementation of the New Deal Compact in Somalia and Somal-
iland. This research found that despite commitments to conduct ‘Fragility 
Assessments’, these remained incomplete several years after the agreement 
(Saferworld et al., 2015:8). As long as conflict analysis with local actors 
remains incomplete, the Somali Compact is missing a critical part of its 
foundation, and the risk of aid doing harm remains very high: “The lack of a 
well-supported, shared understanding of conflict drivers and risks poses a 
number of concerns, including that the process itself could contribute to, 
cause, or otherwise exacerbate tensions, conflict, and reinforce fragility, or 
otherwise only address the symptoms of fragility and not their root causes.” 
(Saferworld et al., 2015:9). The same paper clearly underscores the urgency of 
conflict analyses in Somalia and Somaliland, recommending that the interna-
tional community cease any further implementation of the Compact until the 
Fragility Assessment is complete (Saferworld et al., 2015:15). The obstacles to 
carrying out essential conflict analysis in the Somali case turns out to have 
been a complex mix of timing, trust and financial support. 
 The Somalia case is by no means unique. For many international aid 
actors, their local missions fail to deliver conflict-sensitivity commitments 
made at headquarters often because it is seen as ‘too political’ or because 
funding designations are re-allocated. Very often personality politics play  
a role; local civil society often report that if the EU Mission or UN Country 
Representative does not prioritise conflict analysis, then pronouncements 
from Brussels or New York hold little sway. At the same time, an ‘enlightened’ 
delegation representative has the latitude to make conflict sensitivity a 
priority, and invest in the local relationships that will ensure their success. 
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NGOs have slightly different tendencies. For peacebuilding NGOs like Safer-
world, Search for Common Ground, or International Alert, conflict sensitivity  
is a core operating principle. For multi-mandate NGOs and many UN agencies, 
conflict-sensitivity is one of many cross-cutting themes that must be inte-
grated in the course of broader humanitarian or development priorities. The 
multi-sectoral aid actors tend to be convinced about the need for conflict 
analysis and conflict sensitivity by immediate and clear improvements to 
programme design and effectiveness.
1.3.4 Conclusions
In many ways, bridging the local-global divide on conflict-sensitivity requires 
resisting the ‘Shiny New Object’ syndrome common in the world of aid. In the 
last decade and a half, aid per capita to fragile states has doubled, and since 
2007, the majority of all aid has been allocated to fragile states and economies 
(OECD, 2015: 59). During that same decade, nearly a quarter of aid went to 
Afghanistan and Iraq (OECD, 2015: 61), reflecting more the military-security 
concerns of the largest aid donors than a purely conflict-sensitive approach. 
In that atmosphere of increasing aid flows to fragile states, and aid politicised 
by security considerations, the pressure for new, rapid, high-profile, and 
cheap interventions is considerable. The desire from some donors for ’quick 
impact projects’ in conflict contexts puts even greater pressure on the disci-
pline of conflict-sensitivity. 15 years after ‘Do No Harm’, the most effective 
approaches to conflict-sensitivity are neither ‘shiny’ nor ‘new’. Particularly the 
discipline of consistent and inclusive conflict analysis is quite unspectacular, 
but as the Somali case demonstrates, pivotal to the effectiveness of all aid 
efforts. 
 Conflict-sensitive aid actors have an important accountability role to 
play. Organisations committed to bridging the local-global gap on conflict 
sensitivity must continue the best practices – especially conflict analysis 
– that best serve the interests of the people receiving aid. Those same organi-
sations have a responsibility to draw attention to the rhetorical gap between 
institutional commitments on conflict-sensitivity with local actors and the 
challenges of doing it in practice. In other words, proponents of conflict-sensi-
tivity must apply policy pressure from above and implementation pressure 
from below. We may have to stretch further than we like on rapid conflict 
analysis and continue to do more with less until we can make a more robust 
case for consistently funding conflict analysis. We may have to publish con-
flict analyses (appropriately anonymised) that we might have kept private 
before. Nevertheless, we must continue to preach the benefits of conflict-
sensitive approaches as well as be sure to practice what we preach. Advocat-
ing for and practicing conflict-sensitivity requires answering the difficult 
challenges of delicate politics, competing priorities, and precious funding. As 
aid shifts to more conflict-affected contexts than ever before, the importance 
of bridging the global-local divide on conflict-sensitivity will only increase, as 
will the importance of organisations who span that divide. In many ways, the 
future well-being of the recipients of our aid rests on our ability to hold each 
other accountable to get conflict-sensitivity right.
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 1 I would like to thank Annemarie Sancar, 
Senior Gender Advisor at KOFF/swiss-
peace, for her valuable contributions and 
feedback on earlier versions of this article.
2 This has also been spurred by the impor-
tant but not completely unproblematic 
categorization of SGBV as a weapon of war 
(see Ayiera, 2010).
3 For instance by discursively producing 
women as a special interest group.
1.4  Taking Gender Seriously in Conflict Sensitivity1
  Marieke Fröhlich
 
Conflict sensitive approaches to development must be premised on a critical 
gender perspective to be effective. Societies, but also our own work and 
positions as practitioners are highly influenced by gendered structures and 
dynamics, positioning approaches to conflict sensitivity in a framework of 
masculinist knowledge production. The goals of conflict sensitivity, namely to 
minimize negative impacts on conflict dynamics and foster a “peace promot-
ing” (cfd, 2014:1) influence through a given intervention, can only be achieved 
through engaging with gendered structures of power relations. This is because 
gender “in a structural sense is a primary way of signifying relationships of 
power” (Tickner, 2001: 16), and power relations and inequalities are at the very 
base of conflicts. By taking the conventional approach to conflict sensitivity 
for granted –which remains rooted in masculinist ontology – there is a chance 
of perpetuating or even reinforcing gendered inequalities and hence exacer-
bating conflicts. Therefore, I argue that a critical gender perspective needs to 
be incorporated in conflict sensitivity. 
1.4.1 Taking stock: Conflict sensitivity and gender 
Gender in itself is nothing new to conflict sensitivity. As a topic, gender has 
made its way into most fields of international cooperation (at least as a box to 
tick) and has been a consideration in most conflict sensitivity approaches. 
This is a great achievement. However, these considerations are often limited 
to direct physical violence against women, such as sexual and gender based 
violence (SGBV)2 or supporting the argument that women as a group are 
important to consider in project implementation, purporting gender merely  
as an identity category. This then leads to supposed gender sensitivity being 
confused with the mere incorporation of women into projects or analyses. 
Such ‘add women and stir’ methods have led to the legitimation of approaches 
as gender sensitive merely due to the inclusion of women, when they have in 
fact more likely worked against any form of feminist or critical gender per-
spective and rather reinforced gendered power inequalities.3 This is not least 
also due to a lack of considering the relational aspect of gender and hence the 
importance of also engaging with men and masculinities for gender justice 
(Jacobs, Jacobson and Marchbank, 2000). 
 Nevertheless, some approaches to conflict sensitivity refer to the more 
structural and symbolic level of gender relations, an important step forward in 
taking gender seriously. For instance, in the topic guide on conflict sensitivity, 
Haider (2014) mentions gender inequality as a potentially crucial factor of 
insecurity leading to conflict. She mentions the necessity of analyzing the 
differing effects of conflict on men and women as well as the intersectionality 
of gender with other social divisions. While such considerations already go 
much further than ‘adding women’, they still remain insufficient. Such 
approaches still consider gender merely as a specific theme, while they fail  
to make clear and conceptual connections between power and gender at a 
systemic level. 
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 A critical gender perspective and a conflict sensitivity approach can and 
should inform and re-inforce one another. For this, we need to consider the 
gendered nature of conflict sensitivity, as it was developed within a framework 
of patriarchal power structures. Gender symbolisms and the gendered nature 
of power structures are so naturalized that it is hard to see their permeation 
even through relatively critical concepts such as conflict sensitivity. Fox Keller 
and Grontkowski remark that “underlying assumptions escape our attention 
by virtue of being too familiar” (1983: 208). A critical gender perspective allows 
uncovering such underlying assumptions in conflict sensitive approaches. Yet, 
conflict sensitivity is not a neutral concept. It is grounded in a specific, 
patriarchal and often liberal logic of knowledge production. Hence, it is crucial 
to question taken-for-granted assumptions from a critical gender perspective 
in order to understand and ultimately transform the reasoning and politics 
behind such conceptualization. The reflexivity of positioning of interventions 
in a given context, as part of a conflict sensitive approach, is already a great 
step; however, the ways this positioning also relates to gendered power 
structures has mostly been ignored. 
 Remaining ambivalent about gendered structures of power and knowl-
edge will ultimately lead to the perpetuation, or even reinforcement of ine-
qualities and injustices, produced through a gender biased conflict analysis. 
Taking conflict sensitivity to ‘a new level’ entails specifically engaging with a 
crucial and critical gender perspective from the initial stage of conflict analy-
sis. This is different from merely incorporating a ‘gender perspective’ via 
‘mainstreaming’ gender. Mainstreaming has shown to fall short of influencing 
deep-rooted, transformative change (Ferguson, 2015). 
1.4.2 A critical gender perspective
Before diving further into the “how” and “why” of such an approach, it is 
important to outline what I mean when referring to a critical gender perspec-
tive. While gender relates to specific societal, cultural and relational differ-
ences and practices between and amongst men and women, it is essential to 
recognize that a critical gender perspective cannot be considered merely as a 
‘topic’; it is a conceptual and political approach. Although power relations are 
deliberated in conflict sensitivity the genderedness and gendering nature of 
power relations is not considered systematically in conflict analysis and hence 
is not adequately deliberated in conflict sensitive approaches. The power to 
define conflict4 and the moment that necessitates a conflict analysis is deeply 
gendered. Only specific questions are asked, only certain actors involved, only 
some connections are made. This very much depends on the positionality of 
those (able to) ask questions and those (enabled to) be asked or give answers.
Gender as an analytical and structural category is different to being merely a 
social category as structural inequalities and injustices are both inherently 
gendered and gendering. This means a two-way process, a person’s ascribed 
gender (e.g. identifying and being recognized as a man) affects their location 
in social hierarchies (e.g. men are dominating the public sphere), but also that 
Critical Reflections
 4 For the gendered dimensions of defining 
conflict and violence, see Demos and 
Segal (2014).
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a person’s social positioning within societal hierarchies genders them. An 
example of this latter dynamic is found in the feminization of economically 
marginalized men; they are not seen as ‘real men’, as they are unable to 
provide for their families or fulfil other ‘masculine’ tasks (see Silberschmidt, 
2001). 
 Gender intersects with other social dimensions and power factors, such 
as class, religion, ethnicity, geographical location and many more. Women and 
men are not homogenous groups. Hence, the ways that aid and peacebuilding 
programs can influence different identities or belongings of men or women in 
diverse ways are important to consider. When working in conflict sensitive 
ways, a dynamic complex social fabric needs to be analysed and understood 
from a critical gender perspective. It is a tense, constantly renegotiating and 
shifting construction, in which conflicts and mitigating efforts are deeply 
interwoven. I therefore argue that critical gender perspectives are at the heart 
of thorough conflict sensitive approaches.
 Yet, it is important to recognize that gender cannot merely be ‘inte-
grated’ as a concept or topic into existing conflict sensitivity frameworks. 
Gender should be the basis upon and through which conflict sensitive 
approaches are transformed, so that a critical gender lens permeates 
throughout its understanding and application. The threads of a critical gender 
analysis and those of conflict sensitivity should be woven together from the 
outset of conflict analysis. Without a critical gender perspective, conflict 
sensitivity is nonsensical, much like ecological analysis without the consid-
eration of the climate. Gender should be considered as one of fundamental 
structuring variables of conflict sensitivity. 
1.4.3 Taking gender seriously 
Sandra Harding (1991) provides guidance for engaging in gender sensitive 
perspectives: to make the familiar unfamiliar, to challenge what has been 
understood as natural or normal. A first step for taking gender seriously in 
conflict sensitivity involves questioning the normative masculine frame of 
normalized epistemologies, institutions and programming. We need to ques-
tion the ways of understanding reality and hence the justifications and mean-
ings of our programs, activities and analyses. Informed by feminist philoso-
phies of sciences, in order to engage in a critical gender perspective in conflict 
sensitivity, we need to be aware of two issues: First, that different members 
of society perceive realities differently at different points in time, and second, 
that the dominant viewpoint has historically been the male one, excluding 
other forms of experiencing and explaining reality (Harding, 1991; Haraway, 
1988). Bächthold (2015: 3) argues that “what [peacebuilding] actors perceive 
as ‘the way to see or do things’ is always a historically and spatially contingent 
construction”. The decisions to focus on a specific group for a given project or 
analysis is a political one. I am not advocating a mere focus on women, not 
least to the relationality of gender and the necessity to engage with men and 
masculinities in order to work towards gender justice. Yet, due to historically 
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established power structures, it is the worries, viewpoints and work of women 
that often fall out of conflict analysis. However, analyzing women’s activities 
and reasoning may reveal deep-seated systemic inequalities and established 
assumptions of power and truth. 
1.4.4 Conclusions
A critical gender perspective and a conflict sensitivity approach go hand in 
hand. Conflict sensitivity can only be taken to the ‘next level’ if transformed in 
ways that weave a critical gender perspective into it. This starts from a 
position of reflexivity, which argues that there is no neutral perspective, but 
that methodological conventions are biased in a masculinist way. It is only 
through a critical gender perspective that one can question the normative 
standards of the masculinist convention. Starting from women’s perspectives 
– as those most often ignored and left out – can be a powerful first step for 
practicing reflexivity. In conflict sensitivity, we need to take a step back and 
question the gendered aspects of each stage within our approaches and 
activities. Further, we need to be aware of how we analyze conflict contexts 
and of the gendering effects our involvement may have. This involves a com-
mitment to take different realities lived by women seriously in every step of 
conflict sensitivity. Not because gender is only about women, but because 
women’s perspectives and realities – that are traditionally ignored – may shed 
light on deeply seated structures of power and social patterns that lay at the 
heart of conflicts. These are issues that thorough and critical conflict analy-
ses and conflict sensitive approaches need to consider. A critical gender 
perspective in conflict sensitivity requires us to ask more and consistent 
questions about power, gender and practice and enables us to work towards 
contributing to more peaceful, just and equal societies. 
Critical Reflections
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2 
Policy Debates
2.1 Conflict Sensitivity and the New Deal: 
 A Conflict of Interest? 
  Dominik Balthasar and Christian Scherer
Just as the ‘do no harm’ edict had led to a reevaluation of international 
humanitarian and development assistance and the programming thereof at 
the turn of the millennium, the ‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’ 
introduced significant changes into the design of policy frameworks for 
international cooperation with fragile states about a decade later. Exhibiting a 
strong link to international efforts geared at peace-building and state-build-
ing, both have captured much attention among practitioners and policymak-
ers. While some have feared that the New Deal may trump and supplant the 
acquisition of conflict sensitivity, there is much ground to argue that the two 
rather reinforce one another. Based on a fundamental concern for ‘context 
sensitivity’, and given differences in nature, outlook and target audience, 
these two approaches appear to be less conflictive than constitutive of one 
another. 
2.1.1 From complacency to conflict sensitivity
During the decades following the independence of most colonial states, 
mainstream international development assistance was marked by a positivist 
outlook.1 Development aid in general and humanitarian aid in particular were 
largely perceived as exerting a beneficial effect on the recipient societies. The 
prevailing assumption was that development assistance constituted a cata-
lyst for the (linear) progress of societies, and that humanitarian aid was 
neutral in nature. Yet, by the early 1990s, documented evidence of humanitar-
ian, development and peacebuilding interventions having detrimental and 
even conflict-perpetuating consequences had accumulated and could no 
longer be ignored. The significant impact aid had had on the Somali war 
economy of the early 1990s, and the way in which humanitarian relief had been 
exploited in the context of the 1994 Rwandan genocide are two cases in point. 
More generally, scholars argued that development agencies frequently 
exacerbated structural violence in developing countries (see e.g. Uvin 1998) 
and that intervention in conflict settings are anything but neutral (see e.g. 
Goldwyn 2013). 
 Against this backdrop, donors and implementing agencies recognized 
that their interventions did not stay aloof of the social tensions and conflict 
dynamics they operated in, and realized the need to better understand both 
the context of the intervention and the inadvertent side effects of their 
programming. This fundamental recognition was spearheaded by Mary Ander-
son (1999) who poignantly argued that “assistance [...] given in the context of a 
violent conflict [...] becomes part of that context and thus also of the conflict.” 
Her seminal work on the ‘do no harm’ paradigm gave rise to the concept of 
conflict sensitivity that evolved in subsequent years. Having primarily been 
targeted at operational NGOs and other implementing organizations, conflict 
 1 For a more critical reading, see e.g.  
dependency theorists (cf. Singer 1950; 
Frank 1969; Lewis 1978).
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sensitivity was soon adopted and adapted also by donor agencies. And 
although it has its roots in the field of humanitarian aid, conflict sensitivity 
has come to be championed by peacebuilders. Given the broad specter of 
conflict sensitive approaches ranging from minimalist to maximalist positions 
(cf. Woodrow and Chigas 2009), it might, in fact, even be apt not to speak of 
conflict sensitivity, but rather conflict sensitivities.  
2.1.2 From ‘Old Zeal’ to ‘New Deal’
A dozen years after the formulation of the ‘do no harm’ edict that brought 
significant changes to programming in the humanitarian and peacebuilding 
fields, a rethinking materialized with regard to international engagement in 
fragile and conflict-affected countries. After decades of donor-driven devel-
opment aid in the context of the Cold War as well as the Global War on Terror, 
donors recognized that change agendas depend fundamentally on country 
ownership and local capacities, and came to formally acknowledge that 
development needs to be steered by the priorities and interests of their 
partners in the ‘Global South’. In 2011, at the 4th High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea, all 33 UN development bodies, all main 
multilateral development organizations, over twenty bilateral development 
agencies, and twenty of those states generally considered to constitute the 
poorest and most conflict-prone countries in the world – the g7+ group 
– signed up to the ‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’.
 The commitment to adapt international engagement to the specific 
challenges of fragile states is largely evidenced by two key elements of the 
framework. First, its implementation in any of the g7+ countries was to start 
with a thorough screening of the context in a so-called “fragility assessment” 
reflecting the strong commitment to, indeed, take the context as the point  
of departure for the new aid agenda. Second, it set out to prioritize on five 
particular peace- and state-building goals (PSGs) considered crucial for a 
state’s transition out of fragility. While the PSGs at large were accepted as  
a given category, the New Deal committed to ensuring that partner country 
governments, and not external actors, define and guide the development 
agenda. Specific sub-goals and indicators were therefore to be developed by 
the respective g7+ governments together with their humanitarian and devel-
opment partners for each context. It is in this emphasis on ‘context sensitiv-
ity’ that the New Deal exhibits an affinity with the ‘conflict sensitivity’ para-
digm of “taking context as the starting point”. However, it is worth noting that 
it had been the donor discourse on aid effectiveness, rather than considera-
tions on unintended consequences of international engagement, that gave 
birth to the New Deal. 
2.1.3 Two sides of the same coin?
In recent years, staunch proponents of conflict sensitivity have feared that 
the increasing attention attracted by the New Deal framework could come at 
the expense of conflict sensitivity, and could, ultimately, exercise detrimental 
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effects on its further development (see e.g. Paffenholz, this volume). While it 
is certainly true that policy paradigms and practitioner concepts are subject 
to ebbs and flows, and even though it can hardly be disputed that the New 
Deal has captured much attention of policymakers and practitioners as of 
late, it is questionable in how far conflict sensitivity and the New Deal have 
entered into competition with one another. Do they really constitute two sides 
of the same coin, with one side necessarily trumping the other? 
 In order to address this question, it is informative to take a glance at the 
communalities and differences of conflict sensitivity and the New Deal as well 
as their ambiguous relationship. On one hand, the two approaches share the 
basic concern to render a solid understanding of the particular context in 
which they operate as the fundamental point of departure so as to improve 
international assistance. Consequently, the New Deal is designed to start with 
a fragility assessment, on the basis of which a compact and an agenda 
between the international donor community and a specific state are agreed. 
Moreover, the New Deal’s preference for implementation practices that are 
not only confined to reducing causes of fragility, but are geared at exerting a 
positive influence thereon, exemplifies that the policy framework takes the 
fundamental idea of conflict sensitivity to heart. A number of other commu-
nalities may be identified, such as the fact that both conflict sensitivity and 
fragility assessments are (designed to be) collaborative, consultative, and 
public. 
 On the other hand, however, important differences exist. First, whereas 
conflict sensitivity was originally conceived as a practitioner’s tool designed 
for improved project programming, the New Deal is a policy framework primar-
ily intended to better structure and coordinate development interventions in 
fragile states. While the New Deal is, despite some inclusion of civil society 
actors, principally state-centric in character, conflict sensitivity is a prag-
matic management approach for organizations implementing humanitarian, 
peacebuilding and development programmes, especially, but not exclusively, 
in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Although conflict sensitivity has 
found entry in donor approaches, it has been largely geared at and perpetu-
ated by implementing actors. Thus, the two approaches operate in very 
different spheres and with different objectives. Second, whereas conflict 
sensitivity seeks to mitigate potential negative effects of a particular aid 
intervention on a given conflict context, the New Deal aims to address chal-
lenges to state-owned peace- and state-building processes. It runs short of  
a regular feedback-loop that would enable it to adjust the framework in 
response to both context dynamics and the (inadvertent) effects interventions 
under the New Deal themselves may exercise in a given context. It thus 
neglects one of the fundamental tenets of conflict sensitivity. Third, whereas 
conflict sensitivity and conflict sensitivity assessments are largely confined 
to specific interventions at the program or even project level, the New Deal’s 
fragility assessments and progress reports carry far-reaching political weight 
and symbolic bearing on international relations. 
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 In addition to these differences, conflict sensitivity and the New Deal 
are marked by a tenuous relationship. Against the background that fragility 
assessments have either not been conducted at all or only insufficiently so, 
and with New Deal compact processes being pushed through mainly by donors 
and under severe time constraints, it remains questionable in how far the New 
Deal framework has proven to be conflict sensitive in practice thus far. Fur-
ther, whereas conflict sensitivity is designed to allow for a quick, pragmatic, 
and dynamic steering of programs of international assistance in response to 
changes in the (conflict) environment, the New Deal is much more rigid. Its 
ability to take important alterations into account is restricted and much 
dependent on political considerations, further calling the de facto conflict 
sensitivity of the New Deal into question. Finally, even though conflict sensi-
tivity assessments are rarely if ever totally norm-free, as they typically 
presuppose that conflicts can be transformed peacefully and that this is 
preferable to any use of violence (Woocher, 2011:4), they leave much more 
(creative) space for addressing identified challenges. In contrast, the New 
Deal fragility assessments are highly prescriptive in nature as they follow the 
PSGs and, hence, reflect the prevailing peace-building and state-building 
assumptions of the donor community.
 Given such major differences, it appears that conflict sensitivity and the 
New Deal do not constitute two sides of the same coin, but are rather two 
different, though related, coins altogether. Their major underlying tools 
significantly diverge in their origin and outlook, operating altitude and target 
audiences. Thus, rather than competing with one another, it seems that – if 
applied consistently – the two concepts complement one another. 
2.1.4 Conclusions: Two coins of the same currency
Against this backdrop, fears that the New Deal could take the thunder of 
conflict sensitivity appear to be unwarranted. The New Deal defines engage-
ment modalities to support inclusive transitions out of fragility that are owned 
and led by aid recipient countries themselves. This transition is founded on a 
country-led fragility assessment, which gives rise to a country compact with 
one overarching vision and implementation plan. Even though the New Deal 
itself entertains an ambiguous relationship with conflict sensitive program-
ming in that it tends to be structurally cumbersome and lacks vital flexibility, 
it appears to encourage rather than impede conflict sensitivity. Based on the 
OECD’s first fundamental principle for engagement in fragile states, it takes 
the context as a starting point for its interventions. Taking this common 
denominator from the level of operations to the policy world, the New Deal has 
the potential to act as a catalyst for conflict sensitive approaches across 
different dimensions of international engagement. That said, as the problem-
atic New Deal processes in key pilot countries such as South Sudan and 
Somalia have shown, there remains much room for improvement, especially 
with regard to the framework’s difficult implementation. Given that the New 
Deal is under review at the time of writing, one can be hopeful that answers to 
the above challenges will be found. 
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2.2 Putting Conflict Sensitive Development into 
 DFID’s Practice: A Personal Perspective
  Mark Segal
 
Twenty years on from Mary Anderson’s ground breaking work (Anderson 1996) 
it is widely acknowledged by development professionals that aid can do harm 
by increasing conflict. And yet how good are we, in fact, at monitoring unin-
tended consequences of our interventions, mitigating negative effects and 
maximising peacebuilding potential? In this contribution I set out some 
personal reflections on the UK Department of International Development’s 
(DFID) approach to conflict sensitivity, and point to some steps the organiza-
tion could consider to improve its performance. 
In common with other organisations, DFID views conflict sensitivity as requir-
ing three elements. A conflict sensitive intervention (programme, strategy, 
policy etc.) should: 
 — take account of the conflict context in which it is operating. Typically this 
means that the intervention is informed by conflict or context analysis
 — minimise or mitigate any potentially negative (conflict causing) impacts or 
effects – i.e. take a “do no harm” approach
 — maximise any positive (conflict reducing/peacebuilding) impacts or effects 
– take a “peacebuilding” approach
Table 1: DFID understanding of conflict sensitivity
2.2.1 DFID and fragile and conflict affected states
DFID’s budget has grown rapidly over the past five years, as the United King-
dom (UK) progressed towards the UN Official Development Assistance target 
of 0.7% of GNI, finally achieved in 2013. 
 In parallel with rising budgets, there has been a focus on fragile and 
conflict affected states (FCAS), as these are the contexts with the greatest 
development challenges. While many peaceful states made real progress 
under the Millennium Development Goals, FCAS were seen to be stuck, unable 
or unwilling to meet the needs of their people and where we encounter, what 
one colleague calls, “the undrainable sink of poverty”. DFID is increasingly an 
FCAS specialist agency, with 21 of its 28 focus countries in this category, along 
with a clutch of new large programmes focused on addressing the effects of 
war across the Middle East and North Africa. 
 The imperative to be conflict sensitive in these contexts, and at the very 
least to ‘Do No Harm’, is obvious. But this is easier said than done. DFID’s 
approach to conflict sensitivity can be seen in the policy frameworks, tools, 
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programming guidance, and the conflict adviser system. These are considered 
below along with some observations about challenges the organisation faces, 
and some ideas for future improvements.  
2.2.2 Policy frameworks
Sound policy is the basis for conflict sensitivity. Without clear policy on the 
purpose of development in conflict, it is impossible to identify the changes you 
are trying to achieve, or to know if you are contributing to peacebuilding. 
 The most recent statement of DFID’s conflict policy identified the need 
to address both peacebuilding and statebuilding in FCAS.1 The approach drew 
on the available evidence to provide a theory of change for DFID’s assistance 
plans in FCAS (2011: 15). 
 In practice, implementation of the policy was patchy. Some country 
offices adopted the approach enthusiastically, and aligned programming with 
the four pillars of the policy. In others, however, there was a tendency to 
retro-fit the language of peacebuilding and statebuilding to existing pro-
grammes and to continue with the same set of priorities as before. The 
approach, which presented good practice rather than mandatory guidance, 
was insufficient to ensure that strategic choices were set to maximise peace-
building outcomes. So while appropriate policy may be necessary for conflict 
sensitivity, it is not sufficient to ensure that it happens. 
 But policy can also work at a different, lower level. Colleagues have 
observed that policy on overseas security and justice assistance (OSJA)2 has 
contributed to conflict sensitivity. OSJA guidance makes no mention of 
conflict sensitivity, but it asks questions about the human rights performance 
of security and justice organisations that the UK works with. While the pur-
pose of the policy is to manage reputational risk, it allows staff to flag how 
this work may unintentionally legitimise or encourage individuals responsible 
for (conflict/grievance driving) human rights abuses. In the hands of a knowl-
edgeable advisor, human rights guidance can drive better conflict sensitivity.  
2.2.3 Tools
As well as funding guidance and toolkits of other organisations3, DFID has 
developed its own tools to support conflict sensitive approaches. At the 
strategic level these include conflict assessment methodologies, the Strate-
gic Conflict Assessment (2002) and the cross government Joint Analysis of 
Conflict and Stability (JACS) (2012) and a Toolkit for Conflict Sensitivity Review 
(2013). At the programmatic level, they include a conflict sensitivity screening 
tool and monitoring and evaluation guidance. 
 The need for conflict analysis is accepted by officials across the UK 
Government and most conflict strategies are supported by analysis, based on 
the JACS or other political economy tools.4 This is notable progress, but good 
practice is not universal. On occasions, there is resistance to developing 
 1 DFID (2010). The paper pre-dated the 
World Development report on Conflict, 
Security and Development but arrived at 
broadly similar conclusions. 
2 Available at: https://www.gov.uk/govern-
ment/publications/overseas-security-
and-justice-assistance-osja-guidance
3 See www.conflictsensitivity.org and Heider 
(2014) for links to the key tools mentioned 
in this section.
4 Since 2013, DFID has been using a Country 
Poverty Reduction Diagnostic – a political 
economy tool which considers politi-
cal settlement and conflict issues and 
which is contributing to conflict sensitive 
choices.
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analysis, with suggestions that it would take too long, or that we have all the 
analysis available already, even if it is not written down in one place. The 
quality of analysis can be mixed; there may be volumes of tactical observa-
tions, but no strategic overview which brings it all together. And analysis itself 
is no guarantee of good programming, which can be disconnected from the key 
findings.  
 Many factors apart from conflict analysis influence development 
strategies. These include existing programmes and partners, our comparative 
advantage, ministerial and political priorities, our strategic relations with key 
allies and potentially different priorities of UK government departments. 
Joint, cross governmental analysis was intended to overcome these problems. 
The extent to which they remain, however, is indicative of the underlying 
incentives which influence decision making in a government department. 
 While tools are useful, they have not been used consistently in DFID to 
shape programming choices. They are seen as complex, written for the expert 
rather than a time-pressed practitioner, and they are not mandated manage-
ment practices. The language can be off-putting and impenetrable flowcharts 
do not help. Implementation of tools has usually relied on a conflict advisor, 
who also has to deliver on other programming objectives. And mainstreaming 
conflict sensitivity requires high level support for new systems and practices 
which can be seen as a luxury in a hard pressed country office. 
2.2.4 Programming guidance 
In recent years, there has been a move to simplify rules for programme man-
agement, making less of the guidance mandatory, leaving more discretion to 
office heads. DFID has never required offices to be conflict sensitive but there 
is increasing recognition that this should be considered. For example, in 
describing how to write the strategic case for an intervention, the most recent 
version of DFID’s SmartRules states: 
For all interventions in fragile and conflict-affected countries, you should set 
out how intervening will make an important contribution to addressing conflict 
and/or fragility, and how doing harm will be avoided.
Smart Guide: Developing a Business Case – DFID guidance  (2014)
 This guide mentions conflict 14 times (in 28 pages) and highlights the 
need to factor conflict into design, evidence, implementation, monitoring 
results and risk. This is a real improvement on previous conflict blind 
iterations. 
2.2.5 The conflict advisor system
A distinctive feature of DFID is the professional advisory cadre system under 
which it recruits thematic experts. Conflict advisors bring an academic 
background in conflict (a higher level degree is essential) and five to ten years 
of relevant programme and policy experience. One of the key competencies for 
conflict advisors is the practice of conflict sensitive development. 
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 All conflict advisor job descriptions for country work have explicit 
requirements to support conflict sensitivity at strategic and programme 
levels. Most conflict advisors in country roles will be involved in training, 
coaching and advising colleagues in conflict sensitivity, leading and partici-
pating in design, monitoring and evaluation processes, and in some cases 
implementing additional projects to support conflict sensitive practice. The 
Risk Management Office in Nepal for example, was developed with the Ger-
man technical agency (GIZ) with the dual mandate of supporting field security 
for aid staff, and ensuring conflict sensitivity. A joint donor initiative in South 
Sudan is developing a similar approach at the moment. 
 While the conflict advisor network is helpful in providing expertise to 
colleagues, it carries the risk that conflict sensitivity becomes the responsi-
bility of one individual rather than of all staff. The issue can be put into a 
technical box – in the same way that gender was often treated as an ‘add-on’ 
covered by a social development advisor – rather than integrated into the work 
and approaches of all staff working in FCAS. 
CARD-F is an agro-development programme in Afghanistan which supports 
infrastructure (irrigation, roads, etc.) and increases rural employment and 
income opportunities for farmers. The programme suffered from a lack of 
conflict analysis, which led to incidents such as milk collection points being 
built in areas that favoured one group over another. DFID invited CARD-F 
partners to conflict sensitivity training, and shared ideas for conflict analysis 
and mapping. CARD-F rolled out training for all their staff, built complaints 
mechanisms into their programmes and started to share regular feedback 
with DFID about the way the programme was impacting on the conflict and 
vice versa. As a result the programme was able to track and mitigate where it 
was potentially contributing to harm and DFID was able to work with the team 
to identify peacebuilding opportunities. The relationship between DFID and 
CARD-F improved and the idea of conflict impacting programmes was no 
longer hidden, but embraced as a learning opportunity. Key to the success of 
the approach was building trust between DFID and the partner, with reassur-
ance that honesty about problems would be respected and not used to judge 
the partner negatively.
Table 2: Case study – integrating conflict sensitivity in Afghanistan
2.2.6 Specific challenges
As well as the structural factors facilitating conflict sensitivity outlined above, 
there are some specific challenges:
Jargon: the language of conflict sensitivity can be off putting. Conflict sensi-
tivity is often about good development practice; spending time in the field, 
talking to beneficiaries, co-ordinating between programmes etc. Using  
the language of risk management can make it more approachable for 
non- specialists. 
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how-to-measure-peace/
Results: In DFID the results agenda is king, and results are usually defined in 
numerical rather than qualitative terms. Numbers are easier to monitor and 
communicate. Peacebuilding impacts are notoriously qualitative and difficult 
to measure reliably, although by no means impossible.5 The risk is that “what 
gets measured, gets done”, and this makes it harder to prioritise peacebuild-
ing.  DFID is beginning to use more qualitative measures in its approach to 
results, but more progress is needed. 
Spend: pressure to disburse funding resources can be problematic. When 
conflict sensitivity considerations require additional trust building, more 
analysis, new programme locations or partners to balance impacts, or a new 
staffing policy to address perceptions of bias, this can lead to delays which 
may impact the delivery of results. Persuading a manager to hold back a 
programme juggernaut to give time to mitigate these risks is unlikely to be 
successful if there is pressure to hit spending and results targets. The fact 
that a delay may lead to more sustainable programming, contributing to a 
more peaceful context, can be overlooked. That a conflict sensitive approach 
can enable us to monitor our work better, make a better assessment of 
operational security risks, and can reduce reputational risks is also missed. 
Countering violent extremism and terrorism (CVET): addressing the drivers of 
violent extremism, including poor governance, corruption and abusive security 
and justice systems, can be an important contribution to peacebuilding. 
However, concerns about conflict sensitivity of CVET interventions have arisen 
where these are focused primarily on threats to western interests. Given the 
sensitive nature of these activities, it is critical that they are carefully scruti-
nised and monitored for unintended effects at all stages. 
2.2.7 Possible future steps
The DFID conflict cadre has decided to prioritise conflict sensitivity in its 
professional development this year. Experience would indicate that policy and 
tools can be useful but have limited effect in changing behaviour. Instead we 
will try to identify a limited number of steps to incentivise change. The follow-
ing are ideas under consideration: 
 A new conflict sensitivity scorecard: This idea was piloted a few years 
ago in DFID and involved assessing the conflict sensitivity of interventions by 
scoring business cases against a set of simple criteria. The aim was to encour-
age offices and programmes towards good practice, by feeding back their 
scores, and indicating ways to improve their performance. The previous 
attempt was blocked when we tried to institutionalise the system by recording 
the scores. A new system would need to be more informal but still visible. 
 Conflict sensitivity champions: the aim would be to identify and sup-
port, within each country office, a group of individuals committed to building 
conflict sensitivity. With central support, the conflict advisor could provide 
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additional training and mentoring, materials and guidance, and encourage the 
exchange of good practice. Part of the incentive to become a champion, would 
be to gain proficiency in a new conflict sensitivity competency. 
 A new conflict sensitivity competency: currently the conflict sensitivity 
competency is only required for conflict advisors, even though it is useful for 
all DFID staff working in FCAS. It could apply at a number of levels. A basic 
awareness required for all staff would be an understanding of the context to 
ensure an individual does not expose themselves or DFID to risk. A practitioner 
would be able to ensure an intervention took account of conflict sensitivity 
principles. An expert would have strategic level competence, to inform portfo-
lio choices, manage political risk and maximise peacebuilding impact.  
2.2.8 Conclusions
Given the widespread understanding that development can do harm and 
increase conflict, the availability of good quality analysis, tools and guidance, 
and the basic goodwill of the majority of individuals engaged in development 
decision making, it is surprising that DFID has not made more progress in 
conflict sensitising its work. In this context more analysis, tools and guidance 
would seem unlikely to make a difference. Instead, I believe that more efforts 
should be focused on understanding the incentives which drive behaviour and 
shape the decisions and choices made by aid practitioners. 
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 1 See for example, International Alert, 2006; 
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2 See also Hoffmann, this volume, for other 
challenges of implementing conflict sensi-
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Conflict Sensitivity 
and Business
3.1 The Business of Conflict Sensitivity
  Andreas Graf, Andrea Iff, Rina Alluri
The applicability of conflict sensitivity to the private sector was projected 
through landmark publications by International Alert (2005) and the UN Global 
Compact (2005) in 2005. The search for a new approach to responsible busi-
ness practice in conflict-affected areas was a consequence of two main 
developments. Firstly, a growing number of large multinational companies 
faced allegations of having been involved in violent conflicts in countries such 
as Colombia, Nigeria and Liberia (see e.g. Global Witness, 1998; Human Rights 
Watch, 1999). This widely published evidence on corporate involvement in 
conflict not only created public outrage, but also caused serious reputational 
damage for companies; leading some of them to be open to explore new ways 
to address conflict-specific risks. Secondly, peacebuilding and human rights 
organizations increasingly saw benefits in directly engaging with companies to 
support the development of responsible business practices and, where 
possible, activities in peacebuilding.
 Despite this great potential to use conflict sensitivity as a guide to 
responsible business practices in conflict-affected areas, the number of 
companies actively engaging in conflict sensitivity over the past ten years has 
remained limited. While organizations such as International Alert, CDA, 
Saferworld and later swisspeace and Quaker associations have collaborated 
with businesses to integrate conflict sensitivity into their due diligence 
practices and developed additional guidance documents,1 conflict sensitive 
business is far from being mainstreamed. Some of the challenges include 
reluctance from companies to buy in to yet another approach to assist their 
‘social footprint’, barriers of business vs. development terminology and 
ideology, as well as legal concerns by companies.2  
3.1.1 Conflict sensitivity and business: A ripe moment
Throughout the last decade, different non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and multilateral organizations have jointly worked on these challenges and 
started a change process. Today, as a result of this enduring work and interna-
tional developments, the time is ripe for change. This chapter contribution 
argues that four opportunities have emerged to mainstream conflict sensitive 
business practices on a larger scale: 
 — First, the dynamism in the business and human rights debate created by 
the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(UNGPs) and subsequent implementation processes by states and busi-
nesses has generated heightened interest in responsible business conduct 
in conflict-affected areas. Conflict sensitivity has the potential to ensure 
that human rights due diligence processes in conflict-affected areas 
respond to the contextual challenges posed by conflict. 
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 — Second, states, businesses and civil society are engaging in a growing 
number of voluntary and mandatory regulatory initiatives of responsible 
business conduct in conflict-affected areas. Integrating elements of 
conflict sensitivity into these instruments can render them more effective 
and be a catalyst for conflict sensitive business practice. 
 — Third, there is a growing enthusiasm in exploring the potential of business 
contributions to peace that is evident through an emergence of academic 
articles, policy debates and international initiatives on the topic. Conflict 
sensitivity can enrich these activities as it provides a methodology which 
both helps avoiding harm on conflict and serves as the basis for business 
contributions to peace. 
 — Finally, there is an increasingly clear case that companies which fail to act 
in a conflict sensitive manner face multiple risks that affect their bottom 
line. Linking conflict sensitivity with risk management concepts and 
terminology has the potential to better anchor the approach in higher 
echelons of companies and thereby in the business field more generally.
 In the remainder of this chapter contribution, these four key opportuni-
ties are further elaborated on and concluded with some observations on how  
a growing community of conflict sensitive business practitioners can support 
the mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity in business.3  
3.1.2 Opportunity 1: Integrating conflict sensitivity into human rights due  
 diligence processes
Policies by companies and states on responsible business conduct have 
increasingly been defined in recent years through the prism of human rights. 
The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs; UN Human 
Rights Council, 2011) of 2011, which were developed through an inclusive 
six-year process led by John Ruggie, the then Special Representative to the 
UN Secretary General, are widely accepted as a common framework for action 
to enhance business respect for human rights. The UNGPs have triggered 
manifold implementation processes by businesses and states alike (Addo, 
2014). For instance, international businesses are using the UNGPs as a refer-
ence to redefine their policies on CSR and sector- and context-specific guid-
ance instruments are developed to help break down the UNGPs into the 
operational realities on the ground.4    
 Central to the UNGPs is the concept of human rights due diligence.  
They state that business enterprises have a social responsibility to implement 
appropriate due diligence processes to know and show that they respect 
human rights (UN Human Rights Council, 2011). Human rights due diligence 
according to the UNGPs includes four components: assessing human rights 
risks, identifying measures to prevent and mitigate these risks, evaluating the 
effectiveness of the steps taken, and reporting on how business and human 
rights risks are addressed.5 In addition to that, companies have a responsibil-
ity to provide for or contribute to remediation where they caused or contrib-
uted to adverse human rights impacts.6  
 3 These reflections are based on the 
authors’ engagements in the swisspeace 
Business and Peace Program. This inclu-
des academic research on the impacts of 
companies in conflict-affected areas and 
business roles in peacebuilding, consul-
tancy work with companies on conflict 
sensitivity due diligence processes, and 
policy work with various governments and 
international organizations.
4 For a compilation of these initiatives see 
Business and Human Rights Resource 
Centre, www.business-humanrights.org. 
For the description of a company human 
rights due diligence process see for ex-
ample: Nestlé and DIHR, 2013.
5 See Guiding Principles 17-21 (UN Human 
Rights Council, 2011).
6 See Guiding Principle 22 (UN Human 
Rights Council, 2011).
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 7 See Guiding Principle 7 (UN Human Rights 
Council, 2011).
 8 For a more detailed account of this argu-
ment see Graf and Iff (forthcoming 2016).
 The required scale and complexity of these measures are, amongst 
other things, dependent on the operational context. In this regard, the UNGPs 
single out conflict-affected areas as environments where human rights risks 
are particularly high.7 Companies operating in conflict-affected areas are 
therefore expected to engage in ‘enhanced’ due diligence practices in order  
to adapt to the specific contextual challenges (OHCHR, 2014). 
 The question then becomes: What does ‘enhanced’ due diligence in 
conflict-affected areas look like? One approach is to do more of the same. This 
would mean conducting standard human rights impact assessments (HRIAs) 
with more rigour, collaborating with external experts, and taking more elabo-
rate measures to address human rights risks. However, from the authors’ 
experiences of working with companies in conflict-affected areas, this is not 
enough. Because standard human rights due diligence methodologies, while 
focusing on human rights risks, tend in many situations to be ill-equipped to 
help companies avoid becoming involved in conflict. This is of central impor-
tance, because once a company causes or contributes conflict, its human 
rights risks increase drastically in a way which is very difficult to foresee. 
Effective human rights due diligence in conflict-affected areas therefore 
needs to make sure that the company does not become involved in conflict  
in the first place. 
 This is where the potential for conflict sensitivity lies. The integration  
of conflict sensitivity into human rights due diligence practices can be key  
to adapting corporate activities on human rights to the specific contextual 
challenges of conflict-affected areas. There are different areas where an 
integration of conflict-sensitivity methodology into human rights due diligence 
can be fruitful. In the assessment phase, conflict sensitivity can complement 
standard human rights impact assessments to specifically identify conflict-
related risks. Furthermore conflict sensitivity is essential to inform compa-
nies’ activities to prevent and address the identified conflict and human rights 
impacts. Finally, strategies to capitalize on corporate potential to strengthen 
peace and social cohesion as part of conflict sensitive business practices can 
inform and complement measures to prevent or remedy adverse human rights 
impacts.8 
3.1.3 Opportunity 2: Integrating conflict sensitivity into multistakeholder  
 initiatives for conflict-affected contexts
In recent years, various voluntary or mandatory regulatory initiatives linked to 
responsible business in conflict-affected contexts have emerged. These 
include multistakeholder initiatives like the Voluntary Principles on Security 
and Human Rights, the Conflict-Free Gold Standard or the Conflict-Free 
Smelter Program. Apart from these soft-law instruments, there has also been 
some advancement in terms of legal regulation. Examples include the Dodd 
Frank Act 1502 in the United States on transparency of conflict mineral supply 
chains, the currently discussed EU conflict mineral legislation as well as 
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specific requirements for companies which apply for export credits or public 
procurement contracts in various OECD countries. 
 While different in shape and form, all of these initiatives ask companies 
to implement certain due diligence processes with respect to specific princi-
ples of responsible conduct. Oftentimes, these principles include avoiding 
adverse impacts on human rights and/or conflict. While there are ample 
international reference documents with regards to addressing impacts human 
rights, the specific requirements and practical guidance for companies to 
address conflict-specific risks remains very primary in these initiatives (Graf 
and Iff, 2014). 
 Conflict sensitivity can offer a refined and well-established methodol-
ogy and procedural guidance for companies to adhere to the principles and 
standards of conduct of these regulatory initiatives. The integration of conflict 
sensitivity into such initiatives would not only benefit their effectiveness, but 
also have a multiplier effect to mainstream conflict sensitivity in business. 
Companies throughout whole industries would be incentivised to complement 
their due diligence practices in conflict areas with a conflict sensitivity 
perspective. 
3.1.4 Opportunity 3: Integrating conflict sensitivity into the business for  
 peace discourse and initiatives
In the last couple of years, there has been a growing push amongst interna-
tional development actors and civil society to consider businesses as impor-
tant actors in contributing to conflict transformation and peacebuilding. 
Drawing partly on academic findings analysing real-world examples of busi-
ness contributions to peace, multilateral actors such as the United Nations 
(UN) and the OECD/DAC have launched initiatives to strengthen corporate 
involvement in conflict transformation. The UN Global Compact for instance 
established a platform at the end of 2013 called Business for Peace (B4P). As 
part of this initiative, it fosters peer learning among a group of committed UN 
Global Compact member companies. This includes the organization of plat-
forms for exchange, the establishment of indicators to measure the peace-
building activities of businesses or the granting of an award for business 
representatives with outstanding achievements in this field.9 
 Similar dynamics are taking place through the OECD-DAC International 
Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. As part of efforts to implement 
the New Deal (OECD DAC, 2012), the OECD explores the potential of the private 
sector in supporting peacebuilding and development. Such processes aim to 
support better and more sustainable investment in fragile and conflict-
affected contexts and for the moment focus on Afghanistan, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
 Future steps in both of these processes and in similar endeavours by 
other actors will need to establish specific instruments and tools to support 
9 See http://www.business4peace.org for 
general information. For the resulting 
publication on business indicators for 
peace, which was developed by CDA and of 
which the swisspeace Business and Peace 
program acted on the advisory board, see 
UN Global Compact (2015).
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companies in their peacebuilding efforts more effectively. Conflict sensitivity 
with its focus on minimizing negative impacts on conflict and, where possible, 
contributing to social cohesion and peace is well placed to provide important 
foundations for these processes. 
3.1.5 Opportunity 4: Integrating conflict sensitivity into risk management  
 terminology and practice
Evidence-based research on the costs of violent conflict to companies has 
shown the massive costs companies are running into if they fail to act in a 
conflict sensitive way (Davis and Franks, 2014). If a company is involved in 
conflict, its operations tend to be disrupted, its reputation is at risk and there 
are often additional costs like high insurance and premium costs or human 
resources costs spent on dealing with existing conflict.
 This increasingly discussed and acknowledged link between conflict 
impacts and the corporate bottom line provides an opportunity for conflict 
sensitive business practice. The massive loss of investments or potential 
profits through corporate involvement in conflicts with communities are key  
to a growing recognition that addressing conflict impacts is key to successful 
business operations. In this logic, addressing corporate impacts on conflict is 
not seen as a cost centre, as it is still generally the case with CSR policies. On 
the contrary, it becomes a vital component of a company’s profit centres. This 
makes the conflict sensitivity not merely an issue for a CSR department, but 
also for risk managers.
 Implementing conflict sensitivity due diligence processes can be 
understood as an important way to avoid or reduce the costs of conflict. 
Framing conflict sensitivity in risk management language and introducing  
it into risk management practice may present an important opportunity to 
strengthen the case for conflict sensitivity. It would moreover allow conflict 
sensitivity to increasingly be seen as a priority for the top management.   
3.1.6 Conclusions for the community of practice
It is ten years since the first landmark publications on conflict-sensitive 
business. The community of practice has been involved in a constant dialogue 
and learning process with businesses and development partners, as well as 
with each other. As discussed, we see four opportunities, why the ‘time is now’ 
for mainstreaming conflict-sensitive business on a broader scale. In order to 
achieve this, state, non-governmental and private actors working on conflict 
sensitive business need to: 
 — Engage in joint multistakeholder efforts to strategically integrate conflict 
sensitivity into the business and human rights as well as the business for 
peace debates. 
 — Collaboratively identify entry points to introduce conflict sensitivity 
methodology and terminology into initiatives and regulations on responsi-
ble business conduct in conflict-affected areas. This should be done in 
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regulations and initiatives that focus on addressing adverse impacts of 
conflict and those strengthening positive business contributions to peace.
 — Making the business case for conflict sensitivity more explicit for the 
private sector, contributing to debates on risk management and developing 
tools that integrate risk management systems and conflict sensitivity 
methodology.
 — Engage in more exchange and collaborative projects among organizations 
working on conflict sensitive business practice to gain a shared under-
standing on conflict sensitivity in business, develop and foster best 
practices, and coordinate activities to mainstream conflict sensitivity in 
business. 
 This series of contributions on conflict sensitive business practice is a 
first step into that direction and towards strengthened collaboration among 
the community of practice. 
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3.2 From ‘Business as Usual’ to ‘Business for Peace’?:  
 Where do we Stand and What Will it Take?1 
  Anette Hoffmann
The potential of private companies to contribute to peacebuilding in contexts 
of fragility and conflict has taken centre stage in international development 
thinking. By becoming conflict-sensitive, the argument goes, foreign and 
domestic businesses will be able to run their operations more smoothly and to 
the greater benefit of societies transitioning from crisis to peace. While this 
discourse has travelled with ease into influential donor policies and ensuing 
development programming, empirical evidence of the business-peace nexus 
remains surprisingly weak.   
 This contribution begins by specifying the growing diversity of impact 
channels that current development policies presume between business and 
peace. It then unpacks this business-peace discourse by examining its under-
lying drivers and assumptions. Against the backdrop of a refined understand-
ing of the discourse, the article then spells out three critical steps a conflict-
sensitive business approach implies and proposes a set of policy 
recommendations aimed at narrowing the gap between policy discourse and 
practice.  
3.2.1 An in-vogue discourse: conflict-sensitive business and peace  
In recent years, the international community has acknowledged the private 
sector as a key agent in peacebuilding. Earlier negative stereotypes of busi-
ness as a cause of, or a factor in prolonging violence, have given way to 
emphasis of the multiple ways in which business can help foster peace. Those 
recognising the private sector as a key agent in contexts of crisis have typi-
cally focused on its economic contribution to revitalising a war-torn economy 
and generating a peace dividend: businesses help rebuild the infrastructure 
and provide the population with much-needed jobs, income, products and 
services (World Bank, 2012). 
 However, recognition of this positive role has recently expanded the 
economic sphere and stresses businesses’ ability to restore the social under-
pinnings of a peaceful society and a legitimate state. Notably the private 
sector’s ability to provide people with jobs is widely seen as a critical means 
to endow people not only with an income but also with a sense of belonging, of 
social recognition (World Bank, 2010; World Bank, 2012; World Bank, 2014b). 
This renewed interest in the private sector has been reinforced by the largely 
intuitive argument linking unemployment, particularly among young men, to 
an increased risk of violent conflict.2 Or, from a statebuilding perspective, the 
private sector’s potential to generate tax revenues is increasingly understood 
as a source of legitimacy for local governments that can use these revenues to 
provide services to their citizens (Peschka, 2011: 10).3 Moreover, responsible 
companies are credited with the ability to promote norms and values related 
to democracy and human rights and thereby nurture a culture of peace (Forrer, 
2012: 5).
 1 This contribution is a shortened version 
of the original paper “From ‘business as 
usual’ to ‘business for peace’?” Clingenda-
el: CRU Policy Brief No. 28, February 2014.
 2 This argument has been criticised. Collier 
reckons that no macro-statistical relation-
ship between unemployment and conflict 
can be determined (2010: 25), while 
Cramer (2010) rejects that unemployment 
per se leads to conflict, proposing that 
a combination of factors is more likely. 
Further, there is no solid evidence that job 
creation reduces the likelihood of crisis 
(Holmes, 2013; Walton, 2010).
3 For cases in which government is less 
likely to benefit the broader population 
and hence foster state legitimacy, Forrer 
et al (2012) point to the example of a com-
pany in Papua New Guinea that negotiated 
for a portion of the taxes it paid to the 
government to be channelled directly to 
infrastructure projects in the community 
in which it operated.
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4 For an overview of conflict-sensitivity 
approaches by donors implementers  
see for example the online platform:  
www.conflictsensitivity.org.
5 The call for conflict-sensitivity that 
culminated in the OECD’s Fragile State 
Principles (2007), that inhabits the New 
Deal (2011) has been applied to the private 
sector through conflict-sensitive busi-
ness guidelines and efforts. They have 
been complemented by initiatives calling 
on companies in situations of crisis and 
fragility to move from ‘business as usual’ 
to ‘business for peace’.
3.2.2 Unpacking the discourse: underlying drivers and uncorroborated   
 assumptions  
Strikingly, what drives this policy discourse is not a critical number of compel-
ling success stories, in which local or foreign businesses have evidentially 
fostered state legitimacy, enhanced societal relations or mitigated economic 
and political exclusion. Rather it is, at least to some extent, the limited 
success of development aid and the weak performance in fragile states when 
compared to non-fragile states that has prompted a sense of urgency to ‘do 
things differently’ in conflict-affected societies: notably by taking the broader 
peace- and statebuilding processes into account and by working in partner-
ship with the private sector. Furthermore, the persistent challenge to bridge 
humanitarian aid to more sustainable development interventions has repeat-
edly drawn attention to domestic (and to a lesser extent international) busi-
nesses that often operate throughout a crisis and have an obvious incentive to 
continue doing business, even when donor attention and funds typically wane. 
Lastly and more generally, shrinking aid budgets, and a trend towards multi-
pronged approaches combining investment, trade and development agendas 
for fragile states, constitute additional incentives for donors to portray private 
sector development as a critical ingredient to greater resilience and peaceful 
development.  
 Reflecting on these trends that drive the business for peace discourse, 
a number of biases appear that need to be addressed if the discourse is to 
prompt and sustain a meaningful change in business practice. First of all, 
while greater awareness for the broader conflict and fragility dynamics has 
started to pay off in development programming, notably in terms of funding 
opportunities as donors press for the need to make the link between private 
sector development and peace explicit, the financial return on peace invest-
ments is less evident for businesses, whose primary objective in the end 
differs from that of development actors. Secondly, while intuitively compel-
ling, the multiple links connecting business and peace rest on implicit 
assumptions that in practice are rarely tested. Cramer for example stresses 
that in many cases it is not unemployment, but exploitative employment 
practices that fuel frustration and can potentially lead to violence (2010). 
      
3.2.3 Business for peace: what will it take?
Analytically speaking avoiding harm differs from fostering peace. However, 
the term conflict-sensitivity as generally used in international development 
thinking4 and as applied to the private sector in numerous guidelines5 typically 
captures both aspects as part of the same continuum, and involves three 
steps: i) understanding conflict dynamics, ii) understanding the interaction 
between the conflict context and an intervention and iii) acting upon that 
understanding with the aim to minimise potentially harmful effects and 
maximise positive effects on stability and peace. As the following sections will 
show, each of these steps comes with its own practical challenges when 
applied to the private sector.  
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Understanding the political marketplace
First, conflict-sensitivity is defined as the ability to understand the context of 
interventions, including the causes and consequences of conflict as well as 
those factors that have the potential to connect across conflict lines. Thus far, 
the context of business development is primarily understood in terms of the 
formal business environment with its written regulations, and a focus on 
technical business constraints. However, conventional economic diagnostic 
tools fall short of capturing what typically decides upon business success or 
failure in fragile settings:6 informal institutions, personal connections and 
affiliation to a certain ethnic, political or geographically defined identity 
group. To become conflict-sensitive hence requires looking beyond formal 
institutions and understanding the actual rules of the game.  
Understanding the political nature of doing business
Second, conflict-sensitivity entails recognition that intervention and context 
have an impact on one another. Businesses are not only exposed to risks 
pertaining to weak state and market institutions, endemic corruption and 
divisions in society. They also influence and shape these fragile orders, 
inevitably mitigating or exacerbating the risk of conflict. The risk posed by 
conflict-affected contexts, and the impact of businesses on this broader 
environment, are therefore two sides of the same coin. Recognising a bi-direc-
tional relationship challenges the widespread assumption among entrepre-
neurs who perceive themselves as neutral regardless of the highly political 
nature of the context in which they may operate.7 However, the assumption 
that businesses can operate as apolitical agents in highly political contexts 
has been proven wrong in cases where companies have inadvertently favoured 
certain ethnic groups in their hiring policy or unintentionally created tensions 
over land or water usage.   
Conflict-sensitivity requires greater flexibility and additional investment  
Third, conflict-sensitivity requires parties to act on a solid understanding of 
the context and its interaction with business. As a company in volatile con-
texts is likely to be confronted with rapidly changing and probably contradic-
tory signals, conflict-sensitivity entails continuous flexibility and extra 
resources on the part of the private sector to constantly monitor these 
changes and adjust strategies whenever there is a need for it. The linearity of 
existing business tools such as due diligence, risk-assessments, environmen-
tal and social impact assessments, and the budget that is commonly allocated 
for them need to be handled with greater flexibility and innovation.  
3.2.4 Translating the conflict-sensitive business narrative into practice
What the above analysis reveals is that whether or not a business can avoid 
harm and help build peace does not depend on companies alone. It also hinges 
on the commitment of the international development community to systemati-
cally engage with the private sector: 
6 For an analysis of these shortcomings 
see for example Guglielmetti (2010). Also 
looking beyond technical business cons-
traints in fragile settings is: Hoffmann and 
Lange (forthcoming 2016). 
7 Former Heineken manager Jean-Louis 
Homé gives a detailed illustration of such 
a standpoint in: Bais and Huijser (2005). 
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Build up a business case for conflict-sensitivity from a company’s perspective
Growing readiness on the part of the international development community  
to engage with the private sector in peacebuilding has yet to prompt similar 
interest amongst the business community. Although impressive in scope and 
range, normative guidelines will not trigger such commitment. Efforts aimed 
at building up a business case for conflict-sensitivity are likely to be more 
successful.
 — Systematic consultations at policy level with both international and local 
firms on topics related to conflict and peace will increase private sector 
ownership of resulting policies and therefore increase their readiness for 
implementation. The active involvement of large companies in the develop-
ment of the Sustainable Development Goals, launched in September 2015 
signified an important step towards develop a less biased development 
vision. Active involvement of the local business community in the develop-
ment of New Deal compacts at country level will help solicit business 
commitment to implement the way forward.
 — Translate the conflict-sensitivity narrative into business language: To elicit 
greater interest and commitment from the private sector, development 
actors would be well advised to attune their language to the business 
context. An inspiring example of this is an initiative of the International 
Council of Swedish Industry that brought together company managers, 
researchers and practitioner to discuss their experience of working in 
fragile or ‘emerging markets’ (Ganson, 2013).
Complement normative guidelines with practical support
 — Facilitate the preparation of, and companies’ access to political economy 
analyses and conflict-sensitive impact assessments: Donor governments 
can facilitate the production of and access to conflict analyses that explore 
the link between companies or industries and the broader political econ-
omy of conflict in fragile settings. Such analysis should serve as a baseline 
for monitoring business impact on statebuilding and peacebuilding pro-
cesses. By co-funding International Finance Corporations’s Conflict-
Affected States in Africa initiative the Netherlands’ government invests 
into a conflict-sensitive approach that entails such a business-focussed 
conflict analysis and monitoring and evaluation system.
 — Promote training on doing business in contexts of fragility and conflict: To 
raise awareness of the broader and often political effects of their interven-
tions, participatory training courses on conflict-sensitivity should be 
widely promoted. For example, the existing training course on “private 
sector development (PSD) in conflict-affected environments” that was 
developed under the auspices of the Donor Committee for Enterprise 
Development,8 could be extended and adapted to multinational and 
domestic businesses.
 — Consider establishing joint observatories: To facilitate the gathering and 
analysis of situational intelligence in contexts where there is limited data, 
Conflict Sensitivity and Business
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the model of multi-stakeholder observatories, widely used in Latin America 
(Wennmann, 2012), could offer a practical entry point for collaboration 
between businesses, donors and civil society actors.  
Stress governments’ responsibility for peace 
 — Strengthen public-private dialogue for an improved business environment 
and peace: Donor supported public-private dialogue fora can create space 
for a diverse variety of market players to articulate their voices, rebuild 
trust between the public and the private sphere and shape more inclusive 
policy-making. In a recent review of its public-private dialoge (PPD) pro-
grams in fragile states, the World Bank found that corruption and ethnic 
tensions are the conflict drivers that are most successfully addressed 
through those forums (World Bank, 2014a: 18).9 
3.2.5 Conclusions
The purpose of this contribution was to examine an influential policy discourse 
that shapes much of today’s international development agenda. It is the 
assertion that international and domestic businesses can and should play a 
greater role in fostering peace. As the evidence base linking business and 
peace remains weak, and the gap between empirical evidence and the norma-
tive discourse persists, this article identifies what it would take to validate the 
underlying assumptions of a ‘business for peace discourse’ and start closing 
the gap between narrative and practice: i) a business case for conflict-sensi-
tivity from a company’s perspective, ii) practical support to implement norma-
tive guidelines, and iii) greater emphasis on the responsibility of fragile states 
governments and development partners to work towards business environ-
ments that enable both business and peace.
9 Success stories include the Nepal Busi-
ness Forum (NBF) and the Liberia Better 
Business Forum (APSAF) (Utterwulghe, 
2014).
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3.3 Engaging Chinese Companies in Conflict- 
 Sensitive Business Practice
  Hesta Groenewald
For Chinese companies,1 the issues and narrative of conflict-sensitive busi-
ness practice are relatively new. China has invested in many conflict-affected 
countries and contexts where human rights and the rule of law are not 
respected. Western companies have, in some cases, divested from such 
countries in response to public or shareholder pressure or prohibitive legal 
measures imposed by Western governments. Chinese companies have not 
faced the same extent of domestic restrictions and have been freer to invest 
and operate in ways that are most pragmatic for insecure contexts. Yet all 
companies face operational challenges, including security risks to staff and 
assets, financial losses caused by suspended operations, and reputational 
risks.
 Saferworld has been working with a number of Chinese companies since 
2012 on conflict-sensitive approaches and providing advice in South Sudan in 
particular. This contribution presents some reflections on the opportunities 
and challenges for conflict-sensitive Chinese commercial engagements.
3.3.1 Chinese investment in conflict-affected countries
In the last few decades, China’s global economic profile has increased dra-
matically. Flowing from the success of state-supported business in stimulat-
ing domestic growth, China’s ‘Going Out’ strategy adopted the same approach 
to international investment. Chinese overseas investments broadly focused on 
securing natural resources for domestic use and opening up new market 
opportunities for Chinese businesses and products.2 Aligning with strong 
bilateral political relationships, China benefited from investing in contexts 
with lower regulatory requirements than the established markets in ‘the 
West’, and less competition from experienced Western companies. Its 
approach of providing apparently favourable financing and technical exper-
tise, and delivering much-needed infrastructure development was welcomed 
by many developing and conflict-affected states. In return, the packages 
obliged most or all of the services and goods to be provided by Chinese 
companies, giving them business growth opportunities. China’s policy of 
non-interference in domestic politics and of aligning itself with government 
development priorities also appealed to countries that are perhaps frustrated 
by pressures from Western development partners regarding good governance 
and human rights.3 
 Chinese business engagement overseas exhibited four key characteris-
tics (Heng, 2015):
 — Strong relationships with host governments, with little or no engagement 
with civil society and communities and limited experience in public 
communications;
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 1 Specifically State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs), engaged in conflict-affected coun-
tries.
2 On the evolution of Chinese foreign policy 
and conflict prevention engagements, see 
Campbell et al, 2012.
3 For more details of this approach, see 
Heng, 2015: 1-5.
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 — An apparent absence of analysis of sensitive conflict risks and divisions in 
host countries and the approach of host governments in managing poten-
tial conflicts;
 — Promoting long-term partnership approaches rather than focusing on 
short-term contracts;
 — Limited mechanisms for accountability to guide their business practice. 
For instance:
 Chinese companies therefore had high-level political backing, state 
funding and freedom to behave pragmatically overseas while receiving impor-
tant opportunities to develop technical capabilities, products and services. 
Chinese companies are now part of successful international consortia with 
Western companies, for instance China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation will collaborate in Brazil 
with Shell and Total (Gayathri, 2013). 
 But working in insecure contexts has also exposed Chinese companies 
and citizens to risks. Chinese citizens have been victims of kidnappings, crime 
and targeting by opposition forces because of their close association with 
host governments (Alden, 2014: 3-4). In Sudan for instance, 29 construction 
workers were kidnapped in South Kordofan in 2012 (Sudan Tribune, 2014). 
Insufficient knowledge of the context and lack of alternative information from, 
for instance, civil society, reduce many companies’ ability to anticipate and 
mitigate risk. Chinese companies also experienced significant financial and 
asset losses in conflict-affected countries (Heng, 2015: 14-25).
 Weak accountability mechanisms exposed companies to the risk of 
corruption. Conflict-affected countries with deep-rooted governance prob-
lems often present a conducive environment for corrupt practices, and 
investments can become vehicles for elite enrichment. Corruption can fuel 
conflict while also undermining the public benefit of Chinese investments. 
Chinese companies – especially in the extractive industries – increasingly 
recognise the importance of compliance with national laws and international 
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 → Civil society organisations and public shareholders tended not to 
scrutinise company practice because of insufficient publicly available 
information; 
 → Chinese companies were not subject to domestic requirements on 
respecting human rights, environmental protection or social impacts 
(but also see below);
 → State-owned enterprises tended to have executives and Board mem-
bers that were closely linked to the Chinese government and/or the 
Chinese Communist Party.
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standards.  For example, increasing numbers of Chinese companies comply 
with EITI reporting just as much as Western companies (EITI, 2015: 4), although 
the practice is not yet universal.
 Governments in conflict-affected countries tend to undermine or abuse 
human rights and are therefore unlikely to impose human rights requirements 
on Chinese companies.  Chinese companies therefore do not face pressure to 
respect human rights at home or in conflict-affected contexts.
 On broader social and environmental standards, the Chinese govern-
ment has made some progress. The 2006 Corporation Law provides a legal 
foundation for corporate social responsibility of Chinese companies for the 
first time and two sets of related guidelines have been issued by the Ministry 
of Commerce and China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals and 
Chemicals Importers and Exporters respectively (Saferworld, 2013a: 4). 
 To some extent, the risks and losses associated with investing in 
conflict-affected countries influenced Chinese foreign policy, particularly 
towards Africa. China for instance increased its engagement on peace and 
security within the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, and contributed to the 
multinational anti-piracy mission off the Somali coast (Alden, 2014: 1-5). But 
China has allegedly also sold arms to Sudan, fuelling conflict north and south 
of the border, posing a threat to the safety of Chinese citizens and the stability 
of its investment (Campbell, 2012: 98).
 For Chinese businesses, the language of conflict sensitivity – rather 
than human rights - has proved useful as a way to discuss these issues within 
a broader risk management conversation. 
South Sudan and China 
China historically had a close economic and political relationship with Sudan 
– pre- and post-separation – with substantive Chinese investments in the oil 
and infrastructure sectors, and in goods and services (Large, 2012: 6-10). The 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between Sudan and South Sudan in 
2006 transferred most of the oil fields to the South, and with it Chinese 
investment, notably by CNPC. Subsequent years saw heavy international 
public and private investment into constructing the new state. Government- 
(and donor-) funded roads, airports, government offices, hotels, police posts 
and houses needed to be built and the influx of aid and business workers 
further stimulated opportunities for subsidiary businesses (Killick & Rosin, 
2015: 6). 
 However, unresolved conflicts and violence remained constant features 
of the new country. Unresolved CPA issues played out in a dispute between  
the South Sudan and Sudan governments over the fees for transporting oil 
through the joint pipelines to Port Sudan and led South Sudan to shut down 
their oil wells in early 2012. This had disastrous economic consequences for 
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South Sudan – oil revenue making up the bulk of the national budget – result-
ing in an austerity budget and large borrowing on the international markets to 
supplement international aid. CNPC suffered from the shutdown, while the 
Chinese government quietly engaged in encouraging the two sides to resolve 
the issue (Zhang, 2012: 5). In 2013, as it seemed oil was flowing again, China 
promised a loan package focusing on infrastructure projects to be imple-
mented by Chinese companies (Sudan Tribune, 2013). The South Sudan civil 
war that erupted in December 2013, pitting the President and his former 
Vice-President against each other, generated fierce fighting to control the oil 
fields and severely impacted on economic activities across the country.
3.3.2 Challenges to Chinese commercial actors in South Sudan
The current war has halved oil output, severely affecting companies like CNPC, 
but also businesses affiliated with the oil industry and engaged in infrastruc-
ture projects. Companies who were already operational have focused on 
securing their staff and assets, while those who signed contracts but have not 
yet started work are concerned about the government’s ability to pay them 
and the loss of investments to date. Many of these projects were agreed as 
part of the 2013 loan package through the Chinese Export Import (Exim) Bank, 
but funding has not yet been released (Saferworld in-country interviews, 
2014).
 Chinese businesses and the Embassy have invested in information-
gathering on the context to strengthen security and risk management (Killick 
& Rosin, 2015: 7). This was not the case a few years ago, when Saferworld and 
others supported joint research and exchange trips of South Sudanese and 
Chinese researchers, and exchange visits of South Sudanese civil society 
actors to China to stimulate knowledge about the country and its challenges 
among Chinese policymakers.4 
 Chinese stakeholders also recognise the need to overcome mistrust by 
many South Sudanese – as political ally to the Khartoum government, Chinese 
contractors were implicated in past violent displacements that accompanied 
the building of the oil pipeline (in-country interviews, 2015). 
Macro-level challenges
Working through the government structures in South Sudan did not translate 
into a predictable business environment for Chinese companies – indeed the 
government is party to the civil war. Chinese companies may also have become 
complicit in opaque and unaccountable tender procedures, given weak 
accountability mechanisms within South Sudan. The 2013 Exim Bank package 
does not provide much public detail, leaving room for manipulation of tender 
processes. 
 In the current conflict dynamics, association with the government and 
the perception of possible complicity in corruption puts Chinese companies 
– and by extension, Chinese citizens – at risk of being targeted by the armed  4 See http://www.saferworld.org.uk/china/
china.
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opposition or facing resentment from communities who are frustrated about 
not seeing the benefits of economic investments. 
 A close relationship with the South Sudanese government has also not 
protected Chinese companies from the economic damage of political deci-
sions like the 2012 oil shutdown. Oil is a key asset and therefore vulnerable to 
political manipulation. Companies like CNPC and associated businesses who 
invested for the long term, experienced repeated work stoppages due to 
recurrent conflict and violence. Chinese companies investing in infrastructure 
are similarly exposed due to the nature of the work – being present on the 
ground in sometimes quite remote areas means high levels of risk to staff and 
assets from local conflicts and violence.
Micro level challenges
At the micro, operational level, Chinese companies face a range of challenges 
(Killick & Rosin, 2015: 8-11). 
 Public expectations of investment benefits are high and often unrealis-
tic. Chinese companies tend to publish little public information, in local 
languages, about company activities, leaving space for government officials or 
communities to spread false information. If benefits are then not as expected, 
the Chinese companies can bear the brunt of community frustrations.  Simi-
larly, if resources are diverted by government officials and the projects not 
completed, communities may blame the companies.
 The majority of people in South Sudan depend on agriculture or cattle 
for their livelihoods, and any changes in the quality or availability of natural 
resources directly affect their well-being. Even where Chinese companies 
adhere to acceptable international targets in environmental impact, to com-
munities, the real impact on their day-to-day lives may still be frustrating and 
they will likely hold the companies accountable. For instance, water drains 
were dug for a new road in Central Equatoria which diverted rain water into 
some people’s properties. A new road may also cut through cattle grazing 
areas, forcing communities to graze their cattle elsewhere for fear of them 
being hit by traffic.
 South Sudan is one of the poorest countries on earth. Companies 
therefore encounter very high expectations about local employment opportu-
nities that may not match the local skills available or the number of positions 
actually being recruited. This may lead to frustration and action against the 
companies.
 The current war is only one of many security risks companies face in 
South Sudan. Others include seasonal inter-ethnic fighting and cattle raiding, 
violent crime, local political violence and the easy availability of weapons. The 
police and military are sometimes implicated in violence, leaving companies 
vulnerable. 
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 Chinese businesses in South Sudan have consequently adapted some 
operational practices to better manage micro-level risks, but conversations 
about the macro-level challenges remain sensitive.  
3.3.3 Conclusions
In the last decade, Chinese companies benefited from their investments in 
conflict-affected countries. They also experienced first-hand the impact of 
operating in such contexts and developed risk management strategies in 
response. As Chinese companies are now more competitive globally, they may 
in future disengage from contexts where the risks are too high. 
 Chinese companies can contribute to resolving some of the underlying 
issues driving conflict and exclusion in countries like South Sudan by investing 
in the infrastructure necessary to promote economic and social development. 
However, elite capture of such development, government corruption or other-
wise uneven economic growth can significantly fuel conflict, especially in 
fractured societies like South Sudan. Conflict-sensitive business practice is 
therefore needed to translate the potential into practice. This will entail 
making progress on community relations and communications, but also on 
understanding how governance deficiencies and exclusionary politics drive 
conflicts, and ultimately impact on Chinese businesses.
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3.4 Multinational Companies, Conflict Sensitivity and 
 Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC): The Case 
 of Poligrow in Colombia
  Mark van Dorp and Karlijn Kuijpers 
This contribution presents a case study of Spanish-Italian palm oil company 
Poligrow in Colombia, with a focus on the adverse impacts created by its 
operations. Based on the case study, it is analyzed how the company is 
performing in relation to its application of the principle of free, prior and 
informed consent (FPIC) as a crucial element of conflict sensitive business 
practices. The authors recommend the inclusion of conflict sensitivity as a key 
aspect of enhanced due diligence processes and of international standards 
for responsible business. In particular, the role of FPIC needs to receive more 
attention so that local communities, especially indigenous groups, benefit 
from private sector development, and companies strengthen peace rather 
than create conflict.
3.4.1 The impact of multinational companies in conflict-affected areas
Over the past four years the Dutch Centre for Research on Multinational 
Corporations (SOMO) has carried out various case studies on the impact of 
multinational companies in conflict-affected areas as part of a Dutch govern-
ment-funded program, focusing on five countries: Colombia, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and South Sudan.2 These case studies 
focus on the relationship between private sector investment, human rights 
violations and conflict, and feed into policy debates on improved corporate 
accountability in conflict-affected and fragile situations.  
 A thorough case study of Spanish-Italian palm oil company Poligrow  
in Colombia was carried out by SOMO and Indepaz3 between March 2014 and 
August 2015, based on a combination of interviews, analysis of documents  
and database research (SOMO and Indepaz, 2015a).4 The study concludes that 
land-intensive sectors like palm oil are at risk of creating renewed conflict in 
Colombia, where land disputes have been a key driver of the internal armed 
conflict, and where territorial claims remain highly contested. The Roundtable 
on Sustainable Palm Oil’s own complaint mechanism announced an investiga-
tion into the activities of Poligrow in Colombia, following a complaint by two 
NGOs, CIJP and EIA (Norman, 2016). 
 In this contribution, we look at the case of Poligrow from the perspec-
tive of conflict sensitivity. More specifically, we analyze how the company is 
performing in relation to the application of early, consistent, meaningful and 
empowering stakeholder engagement processes, with a focus on free, prior 
and informed consent (FPIC) as a crucial element of conflict-sensitive busi-
ness practices. While this paper is based on a single case study and its 
conclusions cannot be generalized, many of the negative impacts found in 
relation to Poligrow in Colombia are common to other cases of multinationals 
in conflict-affected areas.5  
 1 The authors are grateful to Rina Alluri 
(swisspeace), Eric Abitbol (American Uni-
versity), Yamile Salinas Abdala (Indepaz), 
Esther de Haan and Anne Schuit (SOMO) 
for their comments on a draft version of 
this contribution.
2 See: http://somo.nl/knowledge-centre/
programmes/multinationals-in-conflict-
affected-areas.
 3 Indepaz is the Colombian Institute for 
Development and Peace Studies, based in 
Bogota; http://www.indepaz.org.co/.
 4 SOMO and Indepaz, 2015a. An extensive 
review procedure has been carried out 
before publication to enable the company 
to comment on the report and correct any 
factual errors or provide additional infor-
mation. In November 2015, the report was 
presented and discussed at the Pontificia 
Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá, Colom-
bia.
5 See, among others, Chatham House,  
2015: 3.
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3.4.2 The case of palm oil company Poligrow in Colombia
The context
For more than 50 years, Colombia has experienced an internal armed conflict 
which means it now has the second-largest number of internally displaced 
people in the world (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2015). The 
Colombian conflict is rooted in unequal distribution of land and most of the 
armed violence is triggered by the issue of control over land. The FARC (Revo-
lutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), paramilitaries, state forces and other 
armed groups have been in conflict over a long period of time, reaching the 
most intense levels of violence between 1985 and 2005. In September 2015, 
the two main parties to the conflict, the Government and FARC, announced 
they would sign a peace treaty within six months (WOLA, 2015).
The company
Spanish-Italian palm oil company Poligrow is located in the Meta department, 
in the municipality of Mapiripán. Mapiripán was affected by four massacres, 
all perpetrated by paramilitaries.6 The company arrived in Mapiripán in 2008 
as part of a government strategy to develop the eastern plains of Colombia 
and contribute to economic development. Poligrow’s goal is to plant 15,000 
hectares for the production of palm oil to be sold at national and global oil 
markets. Over the past decades, a large number of land transactions took 
place, often facilitating paramilitaries to ‘whitewash’ their illegally controlled 
land. The Colombian General Comptroller found that 12 palm oil companies in 
Meta department controlled “irregularly acquired and accumulated land”, 
including Poligrow (SOMO and Indepaz, 2015b: 3).7  
Adverse impacts of the company
The case study shows that Poligrow has generated various adverse impacts 
(SOMO and Indepaz, 2015b: 6-7): 
 — Land rights: The total amount of land controlled by the company is more 
than 5 times greater than the legal limit permitted under Colombian law, 
and if the land of local partners is also included this might be even twice as 
much.8 By acquiring large amounts of land without properly investigating 
the history of the land, the company hinders some people affected by the 
internal conflict from returning to the land they originally come from and 
are strongly dependent upon, and thereby harms these people’s land 
rights. There has also been a “Promise of Sale” agreement between Pol-
igrow and a large landowner for the acquisition of an additional 70,000 ha. 
Poligrow denies that it has actually bought this land, but local people claim 
that the company is growing palm oil on this land (SOMO and Indepaz, 
2015a: 67). In addition, according to a report by Colombian NGO, La 
Comisión Intereclesial de Justicia y Paz (CIJP) (Comisión Intereclesial de 
Justicia y Paz, 2015), inhabitants have been intimidated by paramilitaries 
to make them vacate their land which subsequently was taken into use by 
the company. 
Conflict Sensitivity and Business
6 The Massacre of Mapiripán of 1997 was 
the most notorious: it left at least 30 
civilians dead, and members of the army, 
marine and police were found complicit of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity 
(SOMO and Indepaz, 2015b: p.3). These 
massacres directly or indirectly led to the 
forced displacement of more than 22,000 
people during the period 1997-2013 
(SOMO and Indepaz, 2015a: p.36).
7 In the report, it was erroneously menti-
oned that this was reported by the Public 
Prosecutor (La Fiscalía), while in fact it 
was the General Comptroller (La Cont-
raloría General de la República).
8 The maximum allowed amount of cont-
rolled land (Unidad Agrícola Familiar) is 
1,840ha. The companies in Poligrow’s cor-
porate structure control 9,829 hectares (or 
5.3 times the allowed amount), while the 
strategic partners control 11,398 hectares, 
totaling 21,227 hectares (or 11.5 times 
the allowed amount) (SOMO and Indepaz, 
2015a: 67-68, 75). Not all of this land has 
been planted with palm oil.
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 — Security: The company operates in an insecure environment where at least 
four paramilitary groups are present. It provides material support to the 
Colombian army and the police in Mapiripán in exchange for security. The 
research showed that the company has not put in place policies to deal 
with the human rights risks related to this support. 
 — Labour rights: Palm oil plantation employees work in precarious conditions. 
Most of the workers are subcontracted, receive salaries far below the 
minimum wage, and have uncertain or informal contracts. 
 — Environment: The company’s oil palm monoculture requires large amounts 
of lime and pesticides, which pollute the environment, affecting farmers 
and indigenous people in the region. This mostly harms the indigenous 
Sikuani as they are dependent on hunting, fishing and collection of food. 
The company further contaminates local water sources in high-value 
conservation areas and thus contributes to the loss of biodiversity.
 — Tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions: The company’s management is not 
transparent about the rationale for its complex corporate structure which 
includes subsidiaries in various tax havens. This is especially important in  
a context where drug traders and paramilitaries have laundered money and 
have been involved in illegal financial transactions using legal companies, 
among others in the palm oil sector.
 — Dialogue and meaningful engagement: The company’s lack of transparency 
has a negative impact on the scope for communities to meaningfully 
engage with the company. Affected communities, both indigenous and 
non-indigenous, state there is no real space for dialogue during consulta-
tion meetings organized by the company. The company did not obtain  FPIC 
from indigenous groups affected by its operations. 
 It is worth mentioning that the company has also created some positive 
benefits for the community, including education, food security, income 
generation and conservation projects, as well as a 24-hour electricity supply 
in the municipality.9 However, the impacts of these initiatives are limited.
3.4.3 Analysis of conflict sensitivity in relation to the application of FPIC
Following this summary of the impacts of the company’s operations, we will 
now look into the different elements of conflict sensitivity that are relevant  
in the context of Colombia, and connect these to the application of FPIC. As 
defined by International Alert in its Conflict Sensitive Business Practice 
Guidance (2005), conflict sensitive business practice has a number of key 
elements:
 — Awareness of a company’s ability to create or exacerbate conflict
 — Development of mitigation measures to avoid or minimize negative impacts 
on local communities resulting from companies’ own business operations 
or those of their business partners
 9 See: Poligrow Foundation website http://
www.fundacionpoligrow.org/.
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 10 This includes ILO Convention No. 169 (In-
ternational Labour Organisation, 1989) as 
well as the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (United 
Nations, 2008).
11 See: Forest Peoples Programme (FPP) 
website http://www.forestpeoples.org/
guiding-principles/free-prior-and-infor-
med-consent-fpic
12 According to the RSPO, FPIC is obliged for 
all affected groups in the communities, not 
only indigenous communities. Roundtable 
on Sustainable Palm Oil 2013. Fedepalma, 
2014.
 — Application of early, consistent, meaningful and empowering stakeholder 
engagement processes (including FPIC)
 — Transparency about company plans, schedules and prospects
 — Creation of effective channels through which stakeholders can raise and 
address problems.
 Building on the concept of conflict sensitive business, a recent report 
by International Alert and swisspeace highlights the risks and impacts of 
agribusiness companies in conflict-affected areas (2015). The report con-
cludes that while some international corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
guidelines and standards refer to conflict, this is always related to company-
community conflicts and not to larger-scale conflicts such as a civil war. 
However, in the report it is argued that from a conflict sensitivity point of view, 
it is particularly the conflict context that demands enhanced due diligence 
from companies (Ibid: 5). One of the certification systems with particular 
relevance for this case, the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) 
certification scheme, does not focus specifically on the conflict context. Also, 
the above-mentioned report concludes that agribusiness companies need to 
take extra care on the issue of local stakeholders’ participation and act as role 
models for open, participatory approaches to the management of economic 
development processes. If they fail to do so, this can result in opposition from 
local communities, hostility against investors, conflict within and between 
communities and contributions to larger-scale political violence (Ibid: 6).
 Building on these findings, we now analyze how Poligrow is performing 
in relation to one of the most crucial elements of conflict sensitive business 
practices – the application of FPIC for indigenous peoples. International 
conventions require that indigenous and tribal peoples are consulted on 
issues that affect them, and that these peoples are able to engage in free, 
prior and informed participation in policy and development processes that 
affect them.10 It is now a key principle in international law and jurisprudence 
related to indigenous peoples.11 Most FPIC principles contain a number of 
steps that companies need to follow when dealing with indigenous communi-
ties. In compliance with the principles and criteria of the RSPO, which Poligrow 
is trying to obtain certification for, corporate operations should guarantee 
community participation and obtain free, prior and informed consent.12 In 
relation to FPIC, four areas are particularly relevant for this specific case:
 — Dialogue: One of the key steps of FPIC is dialogue with affected indigenous 
communities. Our case study has shown that there was no sufficient 
stakeholder engagement before the company established itself in the 
region, and during its operations. According to indigenous communities, no 
FPIC process has been carried out and there is a lot of resentment among 
indigenous communities, as only very few are employed by the company, 
often in the lowest-paid jobs. Also, the lack of transparency has impacted 
negatively on the opportunity for communities to meaningfully engage with 
the company. Finally, the company has not established a company-level 
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grievance mechanism. It has organized ‘multi-actor dialogues’ on an 
irregular basis, but the problems addressed during these meetings have 
not been adequately dealt with by the company’s management and intimi-
dation of employees has been reported. 
 — Security: Poligrow has contributed to an already fragile situation in 
Mapiripán because of its links to security forces that are reportedly 
involved in human rights violations. This is particularly relevant for the 
indigenous communities living near the company’s plantations. Indigenous 
authorities received threats from members of the army whenever they fish, 
hunt, gather, or visit their sacred sites. There have also been threats from 
paramilitary groups and FARC against community members, and various 
acts of aggression against workers who denounce abuses of their labour 
rights. 
 — Land rights: By acquiring disputed land, it is possible that Poligrow has 
impeded displaced people, including indigenous Sikuani and Jiw groups, 
from returning to the land from which they originate. Part of the land that 
the company controls via its local partners were originally communal 
ancestral lands reclaimed by the Indigenous Sikuani.13 In general, the 
people who were driven off their land during the violent conflict still live in 
settlements and in precarious conditions.  The acquisition of disputed 
land, to which Poligrow has contributed, has increased the potential for 
conflict. It is very unlikely that the company was not aware of these land 
claims and the role of paramilitaries.
 — Labour rights: The company adversely affects workers’ rights in a number 
of ways, including through irregular contracts and preventing workers from 
forming unions. The situation for indigenous workers is even worse, as they 
have fewer skills and less experience, which means that they have more 
difficulty in meeting the production targets, and thus receive lower wages. 
3.4.4 Conclusions and recommendations
Based on the case described in this contribution, the following conclusions 
can be drawn: 
 — Palm oil company Poligrow has contributed to the conflict potential in the 
Mapiripán region because it has contributed to the unequal distribution of 
land, which is a root cause of conflict;
 — By acquiring large amounts of land without properly investigating the 
history of the land, the company hinders some people affected by the 
internal conflict from returning to the land they originally come from and 
are strongly dependent upon;
 — The company occupies indigenous land for the cultivation of palm oil, which 
is one of the reasons why indigenous and other local people, currently living 
under precarious conditions, cannot return to their lands. This has indi-
rectly led to grievances and social unrest among these people;
 13 This relates to so-called baldios, state-
owned lands principally designated for 
small-sclae farmers and indigenous 
peoples. This includes land destined for 
land restitution, for which INCODER, the 
Colombian Institute of Rural Development, 
is responsible; SOMO and Indepaz, 2015a: 
76, 95.
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 — The company continues to acquire new land, which has the potential to 
contribute to new conflict.
 As a result, the company has contributed to an unequal, discriminatory, 
exclusive and undemocratic rural economic model that exacerbates the 
already fragile situation in the eastern plains of Colombia.
 According to international standards for responsible business in con-
flict-affected areas, the company should have carried out enhanced due 
diligence before and during its operations in the region, but has failed to do so. 
Also, the company has not paid sufficient attention to FPIC as one of the key 
elements of conflict-sensitive business practice. It can be concluded that if 
the palm oil company had taken a more conflict sensitive approach from the 
beginning of its operations, many negative impacts could have been 
prevented. 
 Based on this case study, and backed up by more general research into 
the risks and impacts of multinational companies in conflict-affected areas, it 
is recommended that conflict sensitivity is included as a key aspect of 
enhanced due diligence processes and of international standards for respon-
sible business. Conflict sensitivity needs to be included in risk screening and 
management processes, and integrated alongside standardized company risk 
screenings. In particular the role of FPIC needs to receive more attention so 
that local communities, including indigenous and other marginalized groups, 
benefit from private sector development so that companies strengthen peace 
rather than create conflict. The inclusion of conflict sensitivity assessments 
in international standards, such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, would 
help prevent some of the worst impacts of multinational companies in conflict 
environments.
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4
Conflict Sensitivity as a Vector 
for Peacebuilding Across Sectors
4.1 Breaking the Silos: Conflict Sensitivity as 
 an Opportunity to Overcome Silo-Thinking
  Sidonia Gabriel
Today, the international aid architecture is answering the complexity of local 
conflict contexts1 with relatively simple responses. International organiza-
tions work mainly through structures, systems2 and sector wide approaches, 
which tend to focus on one problem at a time. They are rather inflexible to 
work effectively in situations of high complexity, often characterized by 
political volatility, weak institutions and economic instability (Foster, 2000: 
33ff). Further, despite supporting notions of more participation, local owner-
ship and locally led initiatives, policies of the international aid architecture 
seem to serve the maintenance of their own approaches, working modalities 
and structures rather than the needs of local contexts. 
4.1.1 Two problems to consider
These issues create two problems: Firstly, a narrowly focused, sector-specific 
analysis combined with interpretations based on internationally accepted 
discourses about conflict-affected and fragile contexts3, does not capture the 
complexity of the reality. This narrow analysis results in simple causal chains 
that are used to justify particular intervention strategies. This prevents 
interventions from achieving expected results and they risk to do harm in local 
contexts (Autesserre, 2012: 3). Secondly, because international aid policies 
and the resulting interventions are based on a rather narrow analysis, it is 
often not clear why and how the different sectors, such as governance, health, 
education, peace promotion etc. are linked together. Subsequently these links 
are not understood and taken care of in the implementation process.
 Conflict sensitivity requires, as a first step, the understanding of the 
conflict context. In a second step, a conflict sensitive approach compares a 
planned or ongoing intervention against these context-born categories by 
translating these into sectoral and organizational language. In a third step, 
potential negative and positive effects of an external intervention on local 
contexts are identified.4 This contribution focuses mainly on the first two 
steps in order to show how conflict sensitivity with a contextualized analysis 
as a starting point is relevant for multiple sectors. It applies an integrated, 
holistic, analytical lens that is adapted to the complexity of a local context. 
Therefore, the international aid architecture could use conflict sensitivity not 
only to make a positive contribution towards social cohesion and peace within 
a local conflict context, but towards breaking the silos between the sectors 
and the systems of the international aid architecture. Conflict sensitivity 
could lead to more context-relevant and integrated policies, in short, policies 
and interventions that are more meaningful to a context. 
1 Complex situations are characterized by 
a high level of uncertainty, unpredictabi-
lity and social conflict. “The outcomes of 
interventions aimed at solving problems 
under conditions of complexity are unpre-
dictable. So many factors and variables 
are interacting, many of them not only 
unknown but unknowable, that there can 
be no recipe for success.” (Quinn Patton, 
2011: 90).
2 I call development, humanitarian assis-
tance, security and diplomacy different 
systems whereas sectors are referring to 
the group of actors working on the same 
topics such as education, water, gover-
nance, health etc.
3 I am referring to normative discourses 
such as the debate on fragility (New Deal), 
on Women, Peace and Security (UN SC 
Resolution 1325).
 4 The three steps are derived from Mary 
Anderson’s (1999) understanding of Do No 
Harm.
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4.1.2 System and sector-wide approaches to address complexity in 
 local contexts
In order to work in complex conflict-affected and fragile situations, it has been 
emphasized that collaboration between development, security and diplomacy 
was the only way to address these challenges (World Bank, 2011: 186). ‘Whole 
of system’ and ‘Whole of government’ approaches5 are supposed to increase 
collaboration and to address the web of interactions, sectors, topics and 
emerging situations in a multi-disciplinary and integrated approach of all 
actors engaged. It is not about ‘treating’ an individual challenge or problem as 
isolated, but through the shared understanding and analysis of the situation 
through different angles, to address these in a more holistic way and to work 
together in joint strategies, implementation and monitoring mechanisms.6  
It was also acknowledged that every fragile situation is different, and there  
is no one-size-fits-all strategy (OECD, 2006: 9ff; DFID, 2010: 3).
 Another result of the aid effectiveness debate is the sector wide 
approach.7 It was observed that often a large number of well-intended but 
uncoordinated projects were implemented in one area with a high risk of 
duplicating the same activities while completely leaving out other areas. Thus, 
the sector wide approach focuses systematically on a specific sector such as 
health, governance, education, energy or water. It aims at comprehensive, 
coordinated and nationwide sector policies with an increased participation  
of local government and civil society and a results-based management 
approach. (Brown, Foster and Naschold, 2001: 15; APFO, CECORE, CHA, Fewer, 
International Alert, Saferworld, 2004: 2).
 However, critical voices argue that the establishment of the systems 
and sectors had the opposite effect. Instead of handling complexity better, 
practice shows that international actors often applied a ‘tunnel vision’. A 
sector specific assessment captures only a small section of reality and leaves 
dynamics and power relations that go beyond one sector out. This means, 
there is a lack of reference to the overall context and the sectors remain 
isolated in their own analysis and sectoral language. The international aid 
architecture ends up with a multitude of sectoral policy languages and imple-
mentation practices that are difficult to coordinate. Thus, different sector 
languages for different groups of practitioners are created (Mosse, 2004: 647). 
This results in another layer of complexity which leads to mutual incompre-
hension or competition between the sectors with the effect to destabilize or 
prevent coherence between them while consolidating the ‘silo thinking’.
4.1.3 The gap between international policies and local realities
Mosse (2004) observed that policies often respond to the needs of the devel-
opment community and not to those of a local context. He demonstrated that 
external actors interpret events and analyze realities in order to create a 
discourse around these interpretations, a common language to mobilize and 
stabilize support for certain development models and policies amongst their 
own constituency (Mosse, 2004: 648ff).  Also the peacebuilding field makes 
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5 “When political, security, development 
and humanitarian interventions from 
one country are combined, this is often 
referred to as a whole-of-government 
approach (WGA) by development actors 
(…). When this approach is implemented by 
a wider group of actors in the international 
community this is often called a whole-of-
system approach (WSA).” (DFID 2010: 2).
6 Principle 5 of the OECD DAC principles for 
fragile states and situations: “Recognize 
the links between political, security and 
development objectives.”
7 Sector wide approaches entail that “all 
significant funding for the sector supports 
a single sector policy and expenditure 
programme, under Government leadership, 
adopting common approaches across the 
sector, and progressing towards relying on 
Government procedures to disburse and 
account for all funds” (Foster 2000: 9).
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use of a ‘toolbox approach’ which assumes that “(…) peace can be externally 
engineered if one possesses the adequate knowledge, local partners and 
financial means“ (Goetschel and Hagmann, 2009: 62). International organiza-
tions create their discourses with a carefully selected epistemic community8  
(Lemay-Hébert and Mathieu, 2014: 243ff), with international, local govern-
mental and non-governmental partners. For example, Bächtold (2015) 
describes how in Myanmar the selection of the right local partners depends  
on their ability to comply with demands of handling accountability and project 
implementation according to international standards. The international 
cooperation has a power effect on local contexts by including a minority of 
actors that can live up to the expectations and excluding other actors which 
are not organized according to the western bureaucratic form (Bächtold, 2015: 
9). By applying a lens which is conditioned by their own needs, international 
aid and peacebuilding architecture narrows its scope of analysis and misses 
important parts of contextual realities. “They orient the intervention towards 
a series of technical responses and hinder the search for a comprehensive 
solution” (Autesserre, 2012: 20).
 By taking context needs as a starting point of analysis, conflict sensitiv-
ity can be disturbing because it critically evaluates positions and activities of 
all actors involved, also the international ones. It considers international 
actors as part of the local context.9 By making power effects of the interna-
tional system on local contexts explicit, for instance by identifying practices 
that do harm, it puts the mainstreamed international discourses on aid 
effectiveness, peacebuilding and others in to question and it provides a 
context-born lens on current realities that might not correspond with the 
international discourse. Could this be one reason for the fact that even if 
conflict analysis is undertaken, donor policies rarely provide for concrete 
operational consequences (Chigas and Woodrow, 2009: 2) to implement it? The 
application of conflict sensitivity would require them to review organizational 
procedures and activities and to go beyond their sector-limited understand-
ing. The analysis would also force them to look into the effects of their own 
interventions on context and this could destabilize dominant narratives of 
interventions. 
4.1.4 Understanding the conflict context: Conflict sensitivity
Unlike other transversal or cross-sectoral approaches that take either a 
topical (gender sensitivity) or normative framework (human rights based 
approach), the reference framework of conflict sensitivity is the conflict 
context. Ideally, the context realities provide the basis for the creation and 
negotiation of analytical categories which become benchmarks to describe 
and analyze local contexts. In other words, through conflict analysis, interpre-
tations of local conflict contexts are established that influence the activities 
of international organizations and their staff (Autesserre, 2012: 6). Through the 
analysis step, conflict sensitivity constructs its own context-born – and not 
sectorally-imposed – reference framework. Whereas in Mali categories such 
as “social inequalities based on a superficial or dysfunctional democratic 
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8 Definition of epistemic communities by 
Haas: “Epistemic communities are net-
works of professionals and experts with 
an authoritative claim to policy – relevant 
knowledge, who share a set of normative 
beliefs, causal models, notions of empiri-
cal validity, and a common policy enterpri-
se.” (Haas, 1992: 3).
9 The perception of the separation between 
external and local is deep-rooted. Autes-
serre describes how staff of international 
organizations construct their group identi-
ty versus the “other”, local populations and 
authorities. (Autesserre, 2014: 174).
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system”, and “traditional inter and intra communal relations” are examples of 
analytical categories to understand sources of tension or sources of social 
cohesion in the conflict context (Gabriel and Diday, 2013; 12ff), in the Palestin-
ian conflict these would be rather analyzed as “the factional split between 
Hamas and Fatah” and the “dividing and weakening effects from the physical 
blockade” (Dittli, 2011: 1). 
4.1.5 Identifying critical links between the sectors
In the following examples I would like to show how conflict sensitivity could 
support multi-sectoral thinking. The above-mentioned analytical category in 
the case of Mali “social inequalities based on a superficial or dysfunctional 
democratic system” describes the democratic system and the bureaucracy 
linked to it that is producing inequality by legitimizing the traditional elite that 
is in power and informally maintaining power asymmetries by its recruitment 
policy into state institutions. So far, stability has been based on social ine-
quality that has been widely accepted by the local population. In the future, 
this could be a source of socio-political tensions and violence, particularly if 
the young generation is putting these power structures into question (Chabal 
and Daloz, 99: 33). As the current democratic practice influences the delivery 
of state services, traditional power asymmetries play out in every public 
sector, even those that seem far away from the political sphere such as 
health, education or access to basic infrastructures. Therefore, it is not 
sufficient to construct clinics, to engage nurses and to claim that all groups 
have equal access to the services if structural patterns of exclusion are not 
addressed. The category of inequality has to be understood and translated 
into the public sectors; practices of exclusion have to be linked back to the 
local understanding of democratic governance, bureaucracy and patterns of 
power relations in institutions. Is it efficient to increase support for state-
building and to assume that democratic governance, and thus social cohesion, 
will automatically be installed through extended programmes, as many donors 
claim? Or does the extension of statebuilding under these circumstances not 
unintendedly consolidate power asymmetries and thus have negative effects? 
This would be a relevant question in a conflict sensitivity exercise. 
 Another example is the link between security and education. Whereas 
the actors, interests, objectives, discourses, time frames, mandates and 
languages of both sectors could not be further away from each other, the links 
between them become obvious when we look at it from a context point of view 
between 2014-2015 in Mali. With the deterioration of the security situation in 
the North of Mali, the schools have remained closed for about three years 
despite the de-escalation of the conflict. Their re-opening would have been  
a very important symbol for the peace process, for state presence and for a 
return to normalcy that would have inspired the population with a notion of 
confidence. However, the teacher’s union declared the situation not secure 
enough for the teachers to return to the North of the country and the actors  
of the international community (apart from some humanitarian actors) feared 
the security situation and refrained largely from supporting schools. In this 
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case, it would have been crucial to bring actors from the education and 
security sector together with local and national political actors to discuss the 
issue of school reopening location by location and to find solutions adapted to 
the local realities. Again the question here is: how are the sectors able to start 
a conversation with each other whilst speaking different languages? The 
challenge is to share the narrative and analytical frames and to get to a 
solution that involves and serves the local population. Conflict sensitivity can 
offer at least an approach of joint analysis and comprehension and it could 
stimulate a cross-sectoral conversation that could then lead into joint action 
where it is critical and meaningful.   
4.1.6 Conclusions
Context-relevant cross-sectoral collaboration is a process in which the 
relations between the different sectors are negotiated in light of the context 
realities and not in light of sometimes competing sectoral thinking. Conflict 
sensitivity could make an understanding restricted to sectoral silos visible 
and provide alternatives to overcome these. Applied through creativity, debate 
and negotiation, conflict sensitivity requires a practice that comes closer to a 
process than an administrative procedure. Process-oriented methods suit 
complexity of a situation because of their flexibility and emphasis on partici-
pation (Leonhard, 2001:12). Applied in this way, conflict sensitivity brings 
about a diversity of perspectives of different actors and sectors, it recognizes 
the interdependences between these, and it provides a more differentiated 
understanding of power relations of local and international actors regarding 
the local context.  This has the potential to foster a deeper understanding of 
the local context and it could incentivize a context-relevant cross-sectoral 
conversation and collaboration. 
 The question remains how a holistic and integrated analysis could be 
taken up in the rather inflexible structures of the international aid architec-
ture. Seriously applying conflict sensitivity would imply a shift in power 
relations between international policy and local realities by taking context as 
a starting point. It would mean a reorientation of the international aid archi-
tecture towards local contexts, away from their own political, economic and 
security interests. Cross-sectoral conversation and collaboration, stimulated 
by a conflict sensitive approach, could be a first step in this direction. 
Conflict Sensitivity as a Vector for Peacebuilding Across Sectors
78
Bibliography
Anderson, M. (1999). 
Do no Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace or War.  
Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
APFO, CECORE, CHA, Fewer, International Alert, Saferworld (2004).  
Integrating Conflict Sensitivity into Sectoral Approaches.  
In: Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance 
and Peacebuilding. A Resource Pack. Chapter 4.  
Available at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/
view-resource/148-conflict-sensitive-approaches-to-development-humani-
tarian-assistance-and-peacebuilding
Autesserre, S. (2012).  
Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and Their Unintended 
Consequences.  
African Affairs, 1(21).
Autesserre, S. (2014).  
Peaceland.  
Cambridge University Press.
Bächtold, S. (2015).  
The Rise of an Anti-Politics Machinery: Peace, Civil Society and the Focus 
on Results in Myanmar.  
Third World Quarterly, 36(10).
Brown, A., Foster, M., Naschold, F., Norton, A. (2001).  
The Status of Sector Wide Approaches.  
Working Paper 142.  
Overseas Development Institute.
Chabal, P. and Daloz, J. (1999).  
Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument.
The International African Institute and Indiana University Press.
Chigas, D. and Woodrow, P. (2009).  
A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict-Sensitivity and Peacebuilding.  
CDA Collaborative Learning Projects.
Conflict Sensitivity as a Vector for Peacebuilding Across Sectors
79
Conflict Sensitivity as a Vector for Peacebuilding Across Sectors
Dittli, R. (2011).  
Conflict Sensitivity Assessment: International Assistance in Gaza. Aiding 
Fragmentation or Unity?  
An assessment mandated by cfd – the feminist Peace Organisation, HEKS 
– Swiss Interchurch Aid, and the Center for Peacebuilding KOFF at swisspeace 
in cooperation with PalThink for Strategic Studies, Gaza. 21.1.2016.  
Available at: http://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Media/
Topics/Peacebuilding_Analysis___Impact/Resources/Gaza_Conflict_Sensi-
tivity_Assessment_Final_Report.pdf 
UK Department for International Development (DFID) (2010).  
Working Effectively in Conflict Affected and Fragile Situations.  
Briefing Paper C: Links between Policy, Security and Development. 
Foster, M. (2000).  
New Approaches to Development Cooperation: What Can We Learn from 
Experience with Implementing Sector Wide Approaches?  
Working Paper 140.  
Overseas Development Institute, London. 
Gabriel, S. and Diday, N. (2013).  
Rapport: Analyse de conflits au Mali dans une Perspective de Sensibilité 
aux conflits.  
Rapport mandaté par la Direction de Developpement et de la Coopération 
Suisse. 
Goetschel, L. and Hagmann, T. (2009).  
Civilian Peacebuilding: Peace by Bureaucratic Means?  
Conflict, Security and Development, 9(1).
Haas, P.M. (1992).  
Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination.  
International Organisation, 46(1), 1. Knowledge, Power and International Policy 
Coordination.
Lange, M. (2004).  
Organisational Development for Conflict Sensitivity. The Experience of 
International NGOs.  
Journal of Development and Peacebuilding, 2(2). 
Leonhardt, M. (2001).  
Conflict Analysis for Project Planning and Implementation.  
GIZ.  
Retrieved on March 13, 2014. 
Available at:  http://s1f6467ebcdf39f37.jimcontent.com/download/ver-
sion/1250450487/module/2685820709/name/conflict%20analysis_gtz.pdf 
80
Lemay-Hébert, N. and Mathieu, X. (2014).  
The OECD’s Discourse on Fragile States: Expertise and the Normalisation 
of Knowledge Production.  
Third World Quarterly, 35(2), 232-251.
Mosse, D. (2004).  
Is Good Policy unimplementable? Reflections on the Ethnography of Aid Policy 
and Practice.  
Development and Change, 35(4), 639-671. 
OECD DAC (2006).  
Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States.  
OECD: Paris.
Quinn Patton, M. (2011).  
Developmental Evaluation: Applying Complexity Concepts to Enhance 
Innovation and Use.  
New York: Guilford Press.
Woodrow, P. (2006).  
Advancing Practice in Conflict Analysis and Strategy Development.  
Interim Progress Report. 
CDA Collaborative Learning Projects.  
Retrieved on March 13, 2014.  
Available at: http://www.cdacollaborative.org/media/61183/Advancing- 
Practice-in-Conflict-Analysis-and-Strategy-Development.pdf 
World Bank. (2011).  
World Development Report Peace, Conflict and Security.  
World Bank Group. 
Conflict Sensitivity as a Vector for Peacebuilding Across Sectors
81
Conflict Sensitivity as a Vector for Peacebuilding Across Sectors
4.2 Applying Conflict Sensitivity to Security 
 and Justice Programming
  Rachel Goldwyn
To date, there has been very limited application of conflict sensitivity to 
security and justice (S&J) programming, and there is almost no guidance on 
how to customise conflict sensitivity to this sector. Yet conflict sensitivity is a 
very real concern for S&J programming, and given the unique focus on security 
and justice provision, raises several specific concerns. This paper identifies 
five key areas for consideration when applying conflict sensitivity to S&J 
programming. It draws on interviews with S&J and conflict specialists, a 
review of community based policing guidance from a conflict sensitivity 
perspective, and an in-depth application of conflict sensitivity to a specific 
security and justice project in a conflict affected area of Pakistan.
4.2.1 Specific conflict sensitivity considerations for security and justice 
 programming
While the details of the programme always matter, conflict sensitivity does 
not only look into programme details, it also requires consideration of bigger, 
more strategic issues, particularly when applied to S&J programming. Three 
tiers of questions emerge, at meta, meso and micro level.
Meta questions raise wider programme quality issues, for example:
 — Does the programme enhance accountability, and would a lack of work on 
accountability now undermine the ability to enhance accountability later?
 — Is the programme designed for a peaceful or a conflict context?
 — Is the buy-in of key players assured? Is there a sufficient focus on the 
political vs. the technical side of the programme? 
 — Could programme failure worsen the already eroded trust of citizens in the 
state?
 — How does the lack of security and justice drive conflict? Could S&J pro-
gramming inadvertently aggravate those problems?
Meso questions are more strongly rooted in the local context, for example:
 — How might the programme be caught up in narratives of extremists?
 — How might the programme reinforce the exclusion of community X? 
Micro level questions focus on the details of the programme:
 — Where are programme resources invested? 
 — How does this line up against existing lines of conflict/tensions? 
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Such micro level questions can be sourced through any good conflict sensitiv-
ity framework, however there is little guidance in terms of the meso and meta 
questions. This paper sets out key considerations for the meta level.
Does the programme enhance accountability? Would a lack of work on 
accountability now undermine the ability to enhance accountability later?
Applying conflict sensitivity to security and justice programming forces us to 
consider accountability, where accountability is understood to mean “the 
provision of checks and balances to assess whether security actors adhere to 
the laws and policies in force, and stipulate sanctions for abusive conduct.” 
(DCAF 2012, p9). This is because at a very basic level if we improve compe-
tence without improving accountability then we risk creating an effective and 
well equipped security service that could be an obstacle to peace and security 
if it used its skills and capacity to oppress people or violate human rights, to 
pursue conflict escalating actions, or behave in ways that undermine hard won 
gains in trust. Additionally, not enhancing accountability through current 
programming could potentially undermine future ability of the executive to 
hold security services to account.1 
Failure to Promote Accountability in Security Sector Reform in South Sudan
Following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in South Sudan former militias 
were offered amnesties and integration into the SPLA to end insurgencies. 
Leaders of disloyal units were given senior roles, creating an incentive for 
rebellion rather than for peace. The security sector - which already mirrored 
the wider splits in South Sudan - swelled along distinct ethnic lines, making 
the SPLA unstable - and command and control was not established. Much 
donor programming, particularly from 2009 onwards, focussed on statebuild-
ing, including large S&J programmes. 
Prior to a major outbreak of conflict in December 2013, which precipitated the 
scale back or closure of S&J programming in South Sudan: “International 
efforts to transform the security sector in South Sudan focused to a large 
extent on its agencies – i.e. the military, the police, the intelligence services, 
and to a lesser degree on their oversight and leadership. The chances that 
these institutions might be fully successful were reduced by failure on the 
part of the donors sufficiently to match their technical interventions with a 
sustained coordinated political engagement at the strategic level. Without an 
agreed, positive overarching vision for the role and purpose of the security 
sector, guiding both its purpose and actions and its transformation, capacity 
development at the agency level risk merely creating more capable but less 
accountable security services….” (Jeremy Astil-Brown, 2014: 10)
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 1 “Another common response to the weak-
ness (or, in some cases, complete absence) 
of the executive oversight body has been 
to focus solely on the police instead, in 
an effort to go “with the grain” of the local 
context. The risks of such a decision and 
the likely lack of oversight that it might en-
courage needs to be fully appreciated, as 
experience in many countries shows that 
this can seriously undermine the ability of 
the executive to hold the police to account 
in the medium-long term” (Stabilisation 
Unit, 2014: 37-8).
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 Typically security and justice programming tends to be weak on enhanc-
ing accountability mechanisms. They are politically sensitive and national 
Government counterparts don’t want to let programming engage on this area. 
This problem is pervasive – and is widely accepted as a constraint in S&J 
programming. Delivering S&J programming at arms-length through contrac-
tors has further weakened the link between the technical and political dimen-
sions of the work. 
Is the programme designed for a peaceful or a conflict context?
The question of contextual fit has a growing discourse within S&J work, as 
articulated by the Stabilisation Unit: “…the prioritisation of policing objectives 
depends in large part on the security and conflict context. In countries 
affected by violent conflict, the focus is likely to be on protecting lives and 
maintaining law and order. In more peaceful contexts, there may be a greater 
focus on bringing offenders to justice” (Stabilisation Unit, 2014: 10). There is  
a strong overlap with conflict sensitivity here – the overall design of the 
programme should understand the conflict environment. Thus a project that is 
focussed on bringing offenders to justice in a situation of conflict2 or extensive 
violence would be conflict blind. Some common features of S&J programmes 
– such as Model Police Units do not appear to be a good contextual fit for 
situations of conflict.
Is the buy-in of key players assured? Is there a sufficient focus on the political 
vs. the technical side of the programme?
Since S&J reform is deeply embedded within state and non-state institutions, 
the buy-in of key players is fundamental to the success of programming. The 
lack of, or loss of, buy in can not only result in programme failure, but could 
also worsen conflict. In Zimbabwe a conflict sensitivity assessment of a 
security sector reform project highlighted that programmes were seen as 
aligned with one political party and were thus viewed as part of the conflict, 
and that outreach to the potential spoilers to the programme were needed 
along with efforts to bring all the relevant players on board and find common 
ground. The balance between focus on the political (gaining and sustaining 
buy-in) and the technical is thus important from a conflict sensitivity perspec-
tive. The question of buy-in forces us to consider possible linkages between 
security forces and criminal gangs / networks, questions which are often 
avoided as they are felt to be ‘too sensitive’ yet are essential to understand 
possible conflict sensitive concerns.3 Recent research on policing in Latin 
America has articulated a useful way to analyse police and shape police 
reform, by way of the ‘Principle agent model’ (Prado et al, 2012). The principle 
agent model identifies the principle to whom the police force is accountable, 
which in turn drives several other important dimensions of police characteris-
tics and behaviour (e.g. external accountability, attitude towards human 
rights, mode of operation). The research argues that much police reform 
programming in Latin America has failed as they do not address the principle 
agent problem – i.e. the underlying institutional deficiencies and incentives. 
Assessing a police or security service along the lines of the principle agent 
 2 In some situations the term ‘conflict’ is 
shunned by officials, and so programmes, 
funders and implementers use the term 
‘crisis’ or ‘volatile’ instead. 
 3 Recent research among donors in My-
anmar identified conflict sensitivity as 
misunderstood / used as a mask for not 
discussing major conflict sensitivity con-
cerns, conflating conflict sensitivity with 
conflict avoidance (Bayne and Goldwyn 
2015, p. 10).
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model could help highlight where conflict sensitivity concerns will arise in 
relation to the buy-in of key players, as well as wider programme quality 
issues.
Could programme failure worsen the already eroded trust of citizens in the 
state?
S&J programmes (policing in particular) often involve two prongs - referred to 
as ‘demand’ and supply’, where legal empowerment work at the community 
level creates demand for better police services, while police training and 
police reform enhances the supply of police services. The notion of demand 
and supply borrows from economic theory, with the assumption that provoking 
demand for better police services works to ‘signal’ for more supply. For 
signalling to work then we have to expect that for some period demand ‘will 
not be met by / will outstrip’ supply. In some instances radio and TV shows  
are used to generate demand, yet these are broadcast to areas outside the 
locations where a project will support enhanced supply – in these areas 
supply will not increase, creating unmet expectations for enhanced supply.
 If signalling doesn’t work, and supply does not increase as a result of 
increased demand, this too can create raised but unmet expectations for 
enhanced performance / service delivery. If a programme is built on an 
assumption that the lack of S&J contributes to conflict, or more specifically 
– that the failure of the state to provide S&J erodes citizens confidence in the 
state, to further enhance demand without a corresponding increase in supply 
could result in increased frustration among communities, reinforcing their 
sense of a lack of the provision of S&J. This essentially worsens the problem 
the programme set out to resolve. Further, if raised expectations are not met 
and the communities become aware of the sizeable donor funds invested in 
the programme, then this could lead to a further erosion of citizen confidence 
in the state.
 S&J programmes seek to challenge and change practices, and therefore 
there are risks involved. Conflict sensitivity does not seek to prevent risk 
taking, but asks that those risks are managed adequately. This could involve 
additional measures in risk management when raising demand. It might also 
shift emphasis in terms of what matters in terms of increasing supply. For 
example if attitude change is the most important and visible part of enhancing 
the supply of policing, this would indicate that programming should focus on 
attitudes of police over and above work on function and form.
 Integrating conflict sensitivity into demand and supply signalling in S&J 
programming also requires thought and agreement on some very practical 
issues, such as:
 — How demand driven signalling creates pressure for enhanced supply: If the 
demand and supply metaphor holds true, then what level of unmet demand 
is expected in order to provoke enhanced supply? Or put another way 
- what is the level of risk any S&J programme is willing to tolerate in the 
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difference between demand and supply? If demand were outstripping 
supply, what would be the indicators that this was reaching a problematic 
level? 
 — Timing: What are the timelines for the work on demand and supply, and 
what are the expectations of how they should match up? What calibrations 
are needed in each to best manage any risks relating to demand outstrip-
ping supply? 
 — Prioritisation: Given that increasingly supply is unavoidably slow, what are 
the fundamental aspects of enhanced supply that are needed? 
How does the lack of security and justice drive conflict? Could S&J 
programming inadvertently aggravate those problems?
The lack of security and justice is widely acknowledged as a cause of conflict 
in many conflict affected states. S&J programmes are built to respond to this 
root cause of conflict. However S&J responses – in an effort to take a holistic 
approach or to pursue specific donor policy agendas – may lose the focus on 
the actual drivers of conflict. From a conflict sensitivity perspective, under-
standing the linkage is important since only with clarity on how existing 
problems in security and justice provision contribute to conflict can we assess 
whether programming is inadvertently aggravating any of those underlying 
problems. Programming that addresses drivers of conflict is not inherently 
conflict sensitive – to tackle a conflict driver may surface much tension, which 
can result in violence. 
4.2.2 Conclusions: A way forward
There is small but growing recognition of the importance of applying conflict 
sensitivity to security and justice programmes, but the awareness of conflict 
sensitivity in this sector is decades behind that of the development and 
humanitarian community. The cause of this may be that S&J programming is 
assumed to be inherently conflict sensitive - since it is designed to address a 
driver of conflict, shouldn’t it automatically contribute to peace? This logic is 
flawed – projects cannot be assumed to be inherently conflict sensitive, and 
those that seek to address conflict have significant potential to trigger vio-
lence. Another possible explanation could be that where S&J programmes do 
inadvertently contribute to tensions or violence this is seen as straightforward 
programme failure, and the uniqueness of the problem (escalating tension) is 
not seen as particularly relevant. However conflict sensitivity has significant 
value added to bring to the S&J sector, as it can identify problems in advance, 
enabling programmes to adopt preventative actions to avoid inadvertently 
escalating tensions. It often also highlights wider programme quality con-
cerns, helping to strengthen programme success overall. 
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 In applying conflict sensitivity to S&J programming, it will be essential 
to avoid reducing conflict sensitivity to a non-political technical solution, a 
technical fix at the micro level to address conflict concerns that have arisen 
from major political decisions that frame the programme or portfolio, taken 
earlier on by senior donor staff. Instead, conflict sensitivity in S&J program-
ming requires a focus on questions of strategy at the meta and meso level to 
escape a reductionist technical fix approach. 
 This paper identifies a number of very practical questions that can help 
steer project / programme funders and implementers in identifying how to 
customise conflict sensitivity to the S&J sector, but there are undoubtedly 
other meta level questions that have not yet been identified. A wider applica-
tion of conflict sensitivity to S&J programming could surface other useful 
questions, as well as capture examples of the value added of applying conflict 
sensitivity to S&J programmes. Reaching out to S&J donors and implementers 
to make the case for conflict sensitivity is a key next step in taking conflict 
sensitivity to the next level in S&J programming.
Conflict Sensitivity as a Vector for Peacebuilding Across Sectors
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4.3 Monitoring and Evaluation of Conflict Sensitivity:  
 Practical Considerations
  Kiely Barnard-Webster, Nicole Goddard and Isabella Jean1 
Monitoring and evaluating (M&E) the application of conflict sensitivity (CS) in 
aid interventions remains a real challenge for many aid organizations. This 
article outlines the key elements required for doing M&E of conflict sensitivity 
effectively and for enabling the use of the findings for program adaptation and 
improvement. Throughout, it also explores the diverse ways practitioners may 
apply M&E of CS to any type of programming in a conflict context (e.g., peace-
building, relief, development, justice, etc.). 
4.3.1 A two-pronged approach
Effective CS application and use of monitoring data in adaptive programming 
hinges on multiple institutional factors and capacities. CDA’s evidence base 
shows that these factors need to be understood and addressed within each 
organization in order to systematically use and integrate conflict sensitivity in 
operational and programming decisions (Goddard, 2014). But first, let’s 
distinguish between two distinct but related processes that are at the founda-
tion of M&E of CS.
Essentially, monitoring and evaluation of conflict sensitivity requires a two-
pronged approach:
 — A process assessment of the application of CS. Thus, asking the question, 
“Is a conflict sensitive process applied to programming; and, if so, how?”  
At its core, application of conflict sensitivity necessitates quality analysis 
(e.g., factors inducing, exacerbating or mitigating a conflict, or actors that 
contribute to or reduce existing tension) as well as an iterative process for 
updating this analysis. 
Analysis is a mandatory first step of a good conflict sensitive process as it 
provides a ‘baseline’ against which an intervention may assess its impacts on 
pre-existing tensions or on communal cohesion. Quality CS application also 
requires identifying relevant indicators for change at the outset of program-
ming and developing practical systems for capturing programmatic responses 
to contextual changes (e.g., a standing agenda item in weekly program meet-
ings with a question: "what did we change in our program approach this week 
and why?”). Documenting these examples helps to trace the process of 
adaptive programming which is often difficult to reconstruct in retrospect.
 — An outcome assessment of the changes resulting from CS application.  
An analysis of unintended positive and unintended negative changes in  
the local context that result from the intervention in required in order to 
measure the outcomes of CS application. Documenting organizational 
responses to changes in the context supports learning and evaluation 
efforts. 
 1 This contribution is adapted from a paper 
authored by Rachel Goldwyn (CARE UK) 
and Diana Chigas (CDA Collaborative Lear-
ning Projects), in collaboration with the UK 
Department of International Development 
(DFID). The paper intends to expand on this 
practical guidance in order to contribute to 
the development of thinking on monitoring 
and evaluating the application of conflict 
sensitivity in different types of program-
ming.
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CDA’s advisory work with partner organizations consistently points to the 
need for developing appropriate monitoring mechanisms and sufficient 
funding from the earliest stages in the program cycle, in order to ensure 
sustained attention and focus on conflict sensitivity throughout the program 
cycle. Additionally, M&E plans should include processes for ensuring that the 
M&E process itself is conflict sensitive! In practical terms, conflict sensitivity 
practice requires planning ahead and flexibility for mid-course adaptations to 
the program. 
 
4.3.2 Monitoring
Discussing the Value of Conflict Sensitivity Analysis
Any type of programming (i.e., peacebuilding, development, humanitarian, 
justice) can monitor and evaluate sensitivity to conflict (differentially labeled, 
perhaps, as: division, tensions, or structural violence (Chigas et al., 2013: 9) 
within the context. Generally speaking, a robust analysis that encompasses 
multiple perspectives and is user-friendly forms the backbone of quality CS 
application within any type of programming. Analysis also informs the devel-
opment of context-appropriate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for CS 
and serves many important functions throughout the program cycle: 
 — It serves as the baseline of the context, providing key reference points for 
the situation prior to an intervention
 — It informs the intervention design and redesign, and therefore is important 
to the analysis of relevance and appropriateness of an intervention
 — It is required for ongoing evaluative inquiry in monitoring the long-term 
impacts, or observable short-term effects, of an intervention (e.g. rise in 
prices of goods because of influx of aid also known as ‘market effect’). 
Awareness of unintended effects of the intervention is the central tenet  
of good CS work.  
 — It provides a point of comparison for the endline or the point of measure-
ment, enabling identification of unintended outcomes that escalated 
conflict or tensions.
 Ideally, conflict analysis should be the basis for developing program 
proposals. However, evidence from current practice shows that more often 
than not a thorough analysis involving a broad range of perspectives is rarely 
allocated efficient time or resources. This leads to unsatisfactory conflict 
sensitive practice i.e. retroactive or partial analysis of divisive or connecting 
factors and actors in the local context. It is critical for analysis to be included 
as a dedicated line item when developing budget proposals, or should appear 
along with the initial set-up of activities in any program workplan.
 Additionally, as part of program planning and set-up process, it is 
important to ensure that program staff and partners have analytical capacity 
and competencies needed for monitoring conflict sensitivity. A staff capacity 
assessment may reveal the need for practical skill-building workshops and/or 
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demonstration sessions to illustrate how conflict sensitivity analysis has 
helped to positively adapt programs and to decrease tensions caused by 
interventions elsewhere. Capacity development should include both quantita-
tive and qualitative data analysis skills as well as sense-making skills for 
information generated in open-ended listening conversations and through 
feedback channels. Regularly revisiting the analysis will ensure that program 
staff are aware of changes in the context as they occur and engage in joint 
deliberation of the changes needed in the program. Time should be built into 
workplans for regular updates of conflict sensitivity analysis and for conver-
sations with local community members focused on changes in the local 
context and capturing their perspectives on unintended program impacts 
(both positive and negative). There should be sufficient flexibility for staff to 
revisit their analyses based on external or local developments.  Changes in the 
context, as well as programmatic responses to those changes, should be 
documented as part of updating program plans and logframes. This could be 
done using an easy to use template that indicates the changing factors and 
the resulting program adaptations and outcomes. 
Key Questions to Inform Useful CS Monitoring Processes 
As program implementation and monitoring processes begin, the key question 
is, “when it comes to conflict sensitivity, what are we monitoring for?” Rather 
than examining progress toward program goals, M&E for conflict sensitivity 
concerns itself with understanding the following areas:
 — How is the context changing (both positively and negatively)?
 — How is the intervention contributing to those changes? 
 — How is the intervention responding to those changes?
 A monitoring system needs to be adapted for tracking these changes. 
One example of a practical framework for analyzing and tracking changes to 
the context is the Do No Harm framework, which helps to identify ‘Dividers’and 
‘Connectors’ in the specific program context (Anderson, 1999). The dividing 
and connecting factors and actors need to be periodically reviewed along with 
the analysis of how programmatic elements impact each of the factors.  
 An additional and complementary approach to context monitoring 
involves the use of feedback mechanisms. Feedback from stakeholders that 
are not program participants often provides useful additional information 
when monitoring conflict sensitivity, as it draws in diverse viewpoints, poten-
tially revealing useful unintended (or unanticipated) program effects (Bonino, 
2014: 29; Jean, 2013: 4). CDA encourages organizations to adapt their existing 
feedback mechanisms to capture and respond to real-time information about 
unintended impacts of programs on group relations in the local context. 
Feedback loops are particularly useful in cases where over-reliance on indica-
tor-based methodologies can result in oversight of dynamic changes in the 
context and program’s effects on that context. However, the use of community 
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or ‘beneficiary’ feedback in adaptive programming and course-corrections has 
been equally challenging due to institutional barriers to accountability (Jean, 
2012; CHS Alliance, 2015). 
 
Effects of the Intervention on the Conflict
Organizations should monitor for those changes in the conflict context, which 
can be linked to the intervention’s activities (e.g., looking for specific patterns 
of change in the levels of tension or capacities for peace in the context and 
stating how these link to the organization’s actions). These include patterns of 
the distribution of resources, effects on local markets for goods and services, 
changes in levels of influence of local actors linked to the intervention, a 
decreased dependence on local systems, institutions, and mechanisms that 
perform similar functions to those of the intervention, and changing rates of 
theft linked to the resources distributed by the intervention. Effects on 
inter-group relations and conflict will differ depending on the type of program 
intervention and context. For example, a development outcome for a post-
conflict justice sector reform program may be to increase the effectiveness  
of the court system, however conflict sensitivity monitoring data might reveal 
that a particular societal group continues to be discriminated against within 
the newly reformed institutions. Thus, the intervening organization needs to 
be able to monitor for such effects and to adapt their design and programming 
accordingly to avoid negative impacts (CDA, 2011: 2). 
Effects of Conflict on the Intervention
Third, the organization should track those changes to the intervention neces-
sitated by changes in the context. These changes could be on a large scale 
(determining exit strategies, revised theories of change) or a small scale 
(adjusting the details of the program to adapt to increased tensions or 
decreased capacities for peace). 
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Lines of Inquiry for Monitoring Conflict Sensitivity (Chigas et al., 2013: 20-21)
 — What are the drivers of violence or tension in the context?
 — What are the drivers of peace in the context?
 — What actors oppose/support change? 
 — What are the trends in sources of tension in the intervention area?
 — What are the trends in capacities for peace in the intervention area?
 
 — Has the distribution of resources exacerbated conflict? Does it 
favor, or is it perceived to favor, one group over another? 
 — Does the introduction of new resources allow existing resources to 
be freed up to pursue violence or conflict? 
 — What incentives do programs, country plans, strategies, give to 
government or non-state actors to engage in violence or behave in 
ways that increase tension or worsen drivers of conflict? 
 — How have choices about where to work, what to do, with whom to 
work, timing and procurement affected sources of tension or 
opportunities for peace in the intervention area? 
 — Has staff behavior sent implicit messages that reinforce conflict 
dynamics? (impunity, discrimination, non-transparency, lack of 
respect, hostility, aggression, etc?)
 — Have any changes in the conflict made parts of the intervention 
inappropriate for the conflict context? 
 — Are underlying assumptions still valid?
 — What elements of the conflict challenge the effectiveness of the 
intervention? 
 — What trends in the conflict have interfered with implementation of 
the project, or achievement or sustainability of the outcomes? 
 — What measures have been take to reduce risks of the conflict 
undermining the intervention, how effective have they been?
 — How has the conflict affected the safety and security of beneficiar-
ies, staff and partners? 
 — What are the perceptions of local communities and wider stake-
holders regarding the intervention? 
Conflict Analysis
Effects of the 
Intervention on 
Conflict
Effects of the Conflict 
on the Intervention
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4.3.3 Evaluation of CS: Minimum Quality Criteria
Evaluating CS of aid interventions provides an objective assessment of the 
interaction between the design, implementation and overall results of an 
ongoing or completed intervention.  Evaluation of CS examines whether or not 
the intervention has worsened dividing factors in the context and/or contrib-
uted to strengthening local capacities for peace. When evaluating an interven-
tion’s application of conflict sensitivity, it is important to review both the 
outcomes of CS application, as well as the functionality of processes in place 
to ensure conflict sensitive action (i.e. a and b on page 1). The following are 
lines of inquiry for evaluation of CS: 
 — What unintended effects did the project/program have? 
 — How did the organizations respond to those impacts as they arose—what 
changes were made to program plans and design to ameliorate negative 
impacts or amplify positive impacts?
 — Did the organization’s response adequately address the changes in the 
conflict? Were tensions decreased? Were opportunities to build capacities 
for peace taken advantage of? 
 — Was the conflict analysis revised or updated in the course of the program? 
 — How regularly did this occur? What triggered an update of the conflict 
analysis?
 — Has consideration of conflict been included in organizational practices: 
hiring, security, codes of conduct, etc? 
4.3.4 Conflict Sensitive Monitoring and Evaluation
Finally, the process of monitoring and evaluation is in itself an intervention 
and hence should be conflict sensitive too.  Organizations should consider 
how information is gathered, who is consulted and included in analysis pro-
cesses (and who may be inadvertently excluded), and where and when those 
processes take place.  The ethical considerations that typically inform data 
collection processes in regards to safety and protection of participant are 
applicable and highly relevant in conflict-affected settings. But conflict 
sensitive M&E goes beyond the standard ethical considerations and needs to 
take into account the conflict-inducing effects of monitoring and evaluation 
processes in regards to how these are perceived and how these may aggravate 
the inter- or intra-group relations. Currently, there is a dearth in guidance or 
documented experience with conflict-sensitive evaluation processes. CDA will 
be working with evaluation and peacebuilding practitioners to fill this knowl-
edge gap and offer practical guidance for evaluators who conduct evaluations 
in conflict-affected settings. 
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4.3.5 Conclusions
To date, few monitoring & evaluation mechanisms for conflict sensitivity have 
been sufficiently documented or systematically applied which continues to 
leave a veritable gap in evidence and practice on this important aspect of CS. 
Monitoring and evaluation of CS may be happening episodically or on an 
ad-hoc basis, but it often takes place within the ‘black box’ of implementation 
and is less available to learn from as a promising practice. 
 Currently, CDA identifies several barriers to learning about what CS M&E 
mechanisms exist and explanations as to their effectiveness. Mainly, that:  
1) adaptive monitoring processes are often internal, and monitoring data and 
decisions are rarely shared or discussed collaboratively (particularly when 
staff fail to record data and/or the programmatic decisions this data informs, 
which is often the case); 2) organizations that do establish strong internal 
monitoring processes often focus on quantitative monitoring data (Bonino et 
al., 2014) which inhibits the rapid decision-making often required to adjust 
programs that are negatively effecting the contexts where they work. 
 CDA continues to examine M&E of CS as a field of study and hopes to 
convene actors to help address the evidence gap and to inform good practice. 
We encourage organizations to share their lessons learned from application of 
M&E processes to conflict sensitivity with each other and with the CS-Hub 
hosted by swisspeace as this will be help foster learning and inform good 
practice across the sector.
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